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*Lynne Cameron*, The Open University, UK. < [l.j.Cameron@open.ac.uk](mailto:l.j.Cameron@open.ac.uk) >

Lynne Cameron is Professor of Applied Linguistics at the Open University. Her main research area is metaphor in spoken discourse, explored in a range of contexts including classrooms and post- conflict reconciliation meetings. She is Founder Chair of the international association Researching and Applying Metaphor. She has also carried out research for Ofsted and DfES into writing by pupils using English as an additional language in UK schools. Her books include: *Metaphor in Educational Discourse* (Continuum); *Researching and Applying Metaphor* (with Graham Low, Cambridge University Press); *Complex Systems and Applied Linguistics* (with Diane Larsen-freeman, Oxford University Press). A recent NCRM / ESRC funded project produced the Metaphor Analysis website: <http://creet.open.ac.uk/projects/metaphor-analysis>

*Seana Coulson*, University of California at San Diego, USA

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Seana Coulson (PhD 1997) is an associate professor in the Cognitive Science Department at the University of California, San Diego, where she heads the Brain and Cognition laboratory. Her research interests include cognitive semantics and experimental pragmatics, with an emphasis on the cognitive and neural underpinnings of figurative language comprehension. She is the author of *Semantic Leaps*, and the co-editor of *The Literal and the Nonliteral in Language and Thought* (with Barbara Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk) and *Methods in Cognitive Linguistics* (with Monica Gonzalez-Marquez, Irene Mittelberg, and Michael Spivey).

*Vyvyan Evans*, University of Brighton, UK < [Vyv.Evans@brighton.ac.uk](mailto:Vyv.Evans@brighton.ac.uk) >

Vyvyan Evans is Professor of Cognitive Linguistics at the University of Brighton and author of numerous books relating to cognitive linguistics. These include: *The Structure of Time*; *The Semantics of English Prepositions* (with Andrea Tyler); *Cognitive Linguistics* (with Melanie Green), and *A Glossary of Cognitive Linguistics*. His research relates to cognitive lexical semantics, meaning-construction, conceptual structure and figurative language. He received his PhD in Linguistics from Georgetown University in 2000. Prior to his appointment at Brighton, he taught at the University of Florida, Georgetown University and the University of Sussex.

*Klaus-Uwe Panther*, Universität Hamburg, Germany

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Klaus Panther is Emeritus Professor with the University of Hamburg, and has been Professor of English Linguistics (Department of English and American Studies) since 1982. Notable publications include *Studies in Linguistic Motivation* (Cognitive Linguistic Research 28, 2004, Berlin & New York: Mouton de Gruyter [co-edited with Günter Radden]), and *Metonymy and Pragmatic Inferencing* (Pragmatics & Beyond New Series, Amsterdam & Philadelphia: Benjamins [co-edited with Linda L. Thornburg]). He is currently President of the ICLA.

*Chris Sinha*, University of Portsmouth, England, UK < [chris.sinha@port.ac.uk](mailto:chris.sinha@port.ac.uk) >

Chris Sinha is Professor of Psychology of Language. He gained his doctorate at the University of Utrecht. Before moving to Portsmouth in September 2002, Chris taught in Britain, the Netherlands, Denmark and India. He has published widely in many disciplines, including anthropology, linguistics, education, evolutionary biology, connection science, as well as developmental and cultural psychology. He is an experienced plenary lecturer at international conferences and has been a lecturer at many graduate and research schools. He organized, together with Jörg Zinken, the International Conference on *Language, Culture and Mind* at the University of Portsmouth in July 2004.

Chris's central research interest is in the relations between language, cognition and culture, and a main aim of his research is to integrate cognitive linguistic with socio-cultural approaches to language and communication. He is University of Portsmouth Partner Leader for the project 'Stages in the Development and Evolution of Sign Use' (SEDSU), funded by the European Union under the 6th Framework PATHFINDER initiative 'What it Means to Be Human'.

*Arie Verhagen*, Leiden University, Netherlands < [Arie.Verhagen@let.LeidenUniv.nl](mailto:Arie.Verhagen@let.LeidenUniv.nl) >  
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Arie Verhagen has been the chair of Dutch Linguistics at the University of Leiden since 1998. His research focuses on relations between language use and language structure, synchronically and diachronically. Current topics include subjectivity and intersubjectivity (his book *Constructions of Intersubjectivity* was published by OUP in 2005), the expression of causation, stylistic analysis, construction grammar, and evolution. He was editor-in-chief of the journal *Cognitive Linguistics* from 1996 until 2004. He received his PhD in 1986 at the Free University in Amsterdam and has held positions at the Free University and Utrecht University before moving to Leiden.

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This conference is also opened by:

*Alison Wray*, Cardiff University, UK < [WrayA@cf.ac.uk](mailto:WrayA@cf.ac.uk) >  
(web: <http://www.cardiff.ac.uk/encap/staff/wray.html> )

Alison Wray is a Research Professor in the Centre for Language and Communication, and the Director of Research for the Cardiff School of English, Communication and Philosophy. Her research focuses on formulaic language, particularly how modelling the mental lexicon as a repository of multiword strings can help account for native-like idiomaticity, linguistic irregularity, and the evolutionary origins of language.

**PLENARY PAPER  
ABSTRACTS**

**Prof. Lynne Cameron**

The Open University, UK

Tuesday, 28<sup>th</sup> August 2007

TIME: 9am

### *The Discourse Dynamics of Metaphor*

As an applied linguist, language is at the centre of my research concerns and methods in the investigation of ‘real-world’ problems. This paper argues that the usage-based thesis of cognitive linguistics requires attention to language aspects of metaphor that have been pushed aside in the shift to a cognitive focus.

I will draw on a series of empirical studies to discuss theoretical and methodological challenges presented by studying metaphor in its discourse environment. Complex dynamic systems theory is adopted to provide a theoretical ‘discourse dynamics’ framework for describing metaphor in face-to-face conversation, and more generally, as a phenomenon that is at once linguistic, cognitive, affective and socio-cultural.

Empirical data from post-conflict reconciliation conversations illustrate the procedures of metaphor-led discourse analysis, using metaphor to investigate patterns of talking and thinking. Identification of linguistic metaphors is followed by the extraction of patterns of metaphor use, which include metaphor clusters and ‘systematic metaphors’. Connections are made between metaphor in the microgenetic moment of talk, patterns of metaphor use in discourse events and metaphor in socio-cultural life.

I will conclude by discussing the differences found between metaphor as hypothesised in conceptual metaphor theory and metaphor in real-world language use - do these reflect an essential incompatibility between cognitive and applied linguistics, or can these applied linguistic findings contribute to developing cognitive approaches to metaphor?

**Prof. Seana Coulson**

University of California at San Diego, USA

Wednesday, 29<sup>th</sup> August 2007

TIME: 9am

### *Spatial Construals of Time.*

In this talk, I will examine evidence from cognitive linguistics and cognitive neuroscience for the metaphoric construal of time in terms of spatial concepts. I will describe the results of recent electrophysiological studies in my laboratory on healthy adults, as well as in time-space synesthetes, individuals who associate certain temporal concepts with particular spatial locations. Discussion will consider how conceptual integration theory provides a framework for understanding spatial construals of time.

**Prof. Vyvyan Evans**

University of Brighton, UK

Monday, 27<sup>th</sup> August 2007

TIME: 4:30pm

### *Towards a cognitively realistic account of meaning-construction*

In contemporary work in cognitive linguistics, research on meaning-construction has primarily focused on the nature of ‘mapping’ processes which operate behind the scenes. Fauconnier (1997) refers to these processes as ‘backstage cognition’. Conceptual metaphor theory, for instance, attempts to account for figurative language use in terms of relatively stable long-term ‘mappings’ which hold across distinct domains. In Conceptual Blending Theory, ‘mappings’ are posited as holding between more temporary knowledge structures, mental spaces, in attempting to account for the more dynamic aspects of meaning-construction, including figurative language.

This paper sketches a new approach to meaning-construction, focusing in particular on lexical representation and lexical composition in language understanding. This approach is termed the Theory of Lexical Concepts and Cognitive Models, or LCCM Theory for short (see Evans 2006, Forthcoming). LCCM Theory is named after the two theoretical constructs which undergird the theory: the ‘lexical concept’ and the ‘cognitive model’. LCCM Theory

approaches meaning-construction not from behind the scenes, but by tackling the nature of word-meaning, and the compositional processes involved from the perspective of language itself. It thus constitutes what might be termed a theory of ‘front stage cognition’, which should interface with a cognitively realistic account of backstage cognition.

LCCM Theory argues that word-meaning emerges from a complex process of situated interaction. This includes: i) the way in which words are deployed by language users in sentences (or utterances), ii) the way they prompt for and draw upon conceptual (or encyclopaedic) knowledge, and iii) the way this knowledge is integrated, in service of the expression of speaker (communicative) intentions as part of joint action (Clark 1996).

I argue that words conventionally encode schematic dimensions of encyclopaedic knowledge, what I refer to as ‘lexical concepts’ (Evans 2006). Lexical concepts serve as points of access to encyclopaedic knowledge (cf. Langacker 1987). The coherent knowledge structures with respect to which lexical concepts are relativised are what I refer to as ‘cognitive models’ (cf. the related notions of frames, domains and schemas). Meaning-construction involves a process which I refer to as ‘concept integration’. This involves integration of encyclopaedic knowledge accessed via lexical concepts, in a way which is in keeping with the situated communicative intention of the speaker. Concept-integration involves inferential processes on the part of the interlocutor, including concept disambiguation (via a process of background-dependent framing), and the perspectivisation of cognitive models. For instance, the ‘meaning’ of *book* in: *the long book*, versus *the heavy book*, which relate to DURATION OF READING versus WEIGHT OF TOME readings respectively, depends on the nature of the cognitive models which *book* provides access to, and the sentential context which serves to perspectivise different dimensions of that conceptual knowledge. I illustrate LCCM Theory with a range of linguistic data, and show how it interfaces with a theory of backstage cognition.

The theory presented in this talk has a number of far reaching implications which I also briefly explore. For instance, LCCM Theory serves to recast the received view of figurative language in cognitive linguistics (e.g., metaphor and metonymy) as presented in Conceptual Metaphor Theory. I briefly sketch the LCCM account of metaphor and metonymy, which revises the mechanisms with which we model figurative language construction.

*Motivating grammatical and natural gender agreement in German.*

In the early days of Cognitive Linguistics Ronald Langacker (1988: 147) argued that the dogma of the autonomy of (formal) grammar is founded on a *type/predictability fallacy* that confuses the issues of “what *kinds* of linguistic units there are” and “the *predictability* of their behavior”. Full predictability of grammatical structure is obviously not possible; but, in line with Langacker, I contend that much of grammar is conceptually motivated.

A case in point is agreement, a relation of dependence between two linguistic units, where one unit determines the properties of another. Particularly interesting is *gender* agreement in German, in which conflicts exist between *grammatical* and *natural* gender and speakers must choose between formal and conceptual agreement patterns. Some cases, however, allow no choice: for example, the grammatically NEUTER German noun *Weib* ‘woman’ denotes a semantically female referent yet native speakers do not utter e.g. \**die* [FEM] *schön-e* [FEM] *Weib* [NEUTER]. In cases of an antecedent and its co-referential pronoun, the safe choice, in line with prescriptive grammar, is formal agreement, but this often sounds stilted and native speakers do frequently resort to conceptual gender agreement. The variability found in the latter case is the focus of my talk. Specifically, I contend that the factors influencing the choice of agreement patterns in co-reference relations are both structural and conceptual in nature. I also suggest that processing ease may contribute to the preference for one agreement pattern over the other.

**Prof. Chris Sinha**

University of Portsmouth, England, UK

Co-authors: Wany Sampiao, Vera da Silva Sinha & Jörg Zinken

Thursday, 30<sup>th</sup> August 2007

TIME: 2pm

### *Time is not (always) space.*

It has been proposed that there is a natural, universal cognitive domain of time, whose linguistic organization is universally derived via metaphoric mapping from the lexicon and grammar of spatial motion. We challenge this account on the basis of our research on the Amondawa language and culture of Amazonia. Amondawa does not employ cardinal chronologies such as ages of individuals, or ordinal chronologies such as yearly or monthly calendars, since the Amondawa number system has only two numerals with a maximum combinatorial value of four (*mokongaturaipeimeme*: “two and twice one”). An abstract term for time does not exist in Amondawa. The word *kuara* (“sun”) is preferentially used to denote time intervals in general, since it is the movement of the sun which governs the passage of both the time of day and the seasons. The system is based not on countable units, but on social activity, kinship and ecological regularity, that does not permit conventional “time-reckoning”. This does not mean that Amondawa speakers have no time awareness, or that they are unable to talk about events and activities occurring in time. But they do not talk *about* time, or frame relations between events in terms of a notion of time separate from the events and activities.

We advance three conclusions. First, time-based time interval systems are constituted by the use of linguistically organized, materially-anchored symbolic cognitive artefacts. Second, the conceptual domain of “time as such” is not a human cognitive universal, but a cultural and historical construction constituted by schematic time-based time interval systems, reflection upon which is language and culture dependent. Third, because the cognitive domain of “time as such” is a cultural, historical and linguistic construction, the hypothesis that it is universally constructed by metaphoric mapping from the conceptual domain of space is false. Rather, it is the cultural, historical and linguistic construction of the domain of “time as such” that potentiates the linguistically widespread recruitment of spatial linguistic resources for the structuration of the temporal domain.

*'All constructions are symbols' -  
but are all constructional symbols created equal?*

Langacker (2005) compares three varieties of constructional approaches: Construction Grammar (CG, Goldberg 1995), Radical Construction Grammar (RCG, Croft 2001), and his own version, Cognitive Grammar (CogG). According to Langacker, the approaches agree that constructions are pairings of 'form' and 'meaning', but CG and RCG characterize the form of a construction as 'syntactic' or 'grammatical', whereas CogG equates the formal side of constructional symbols with phonological form, with the addition that there may be schematic forms, just like there may be schematic meanings.

The advantage of CogG's view is that it minimizes the number of basic phenomena involved in characterizing knowledge of language: sounds, conceptualizations, and conventional links between the two. However, a serious problem is that schematic sound patterns, unlike schematic conceptualizations, are so general that they represent 'any sound'. This threatens the very basis for the assumption that constructions are symbols, i.e. a kind of signs. A sign consists of some observable phenomenon that is used by a cognitive system to make an inference about some *unobservable* phenomenon (Keller 1998). While parts of words (e.g. syllables, affixes, phonological templates) still consist of observable phenomena, purely schematic sound is not observable, and thus cannot function as a trigger for any particular inference.

A related issue is Langacker's rejection of the view that parts of speech require a 'grammatical' characterization that is independent of (conceptual) meaning. He maintains that a semantic definition of categories like Noun and Verb is possible, using the right kind of schematization. Thus, it seems that in CogG, part of speech labels such as N and V cannot function in the specification of the *form* of a construction.

I will argue that a usage-based rather than a (primarily) conceptual view of parts of speech allows for a solution to the problem of over-schematic forms. The mechanisms involved in sign interpretation may be re-applied to their own output (Keller 1998): what is made cognitively accessible by the interpretation of an observable phenomenon may itself be the trigger for another interpretive step (which is reminiscent of, if not identical to, the notion 'reference point'), and with repetition, this second link may become entrenched, possibly even conventional. In this way, an expression can become a signal for a pattern in which it is typically used; when *different* expressions share a characteristic pattern, the recognition of an element as belonging to this particular class may function to help activate a constructional pattern. This is basically the traditional structuralist notion of a 'paradigm': a class of forms that shares a number of

environments. From the point of view of the constructional pattern, the recognition of an element as belonging to a paradigm specified in an open slot of a construction, can indeed be said to function as a kind of 'form', but not because it is a schematization of 'real' form (i.e. sound).

Ultimately, it can be shown that on this basis, the positions of CogG and RCG may be (even?) closer than Langacker suggests.