

*This chapter is work in progress, but is about three-quarters done, so it does contain useful material (which others have used already).*

## 22

### **Eight ?? special constructions**

At the start of Chapter 3 we looked at the sentence *She will simmer them gently*. The social context was that Paula and her nephew Adam were watching a TV demonstration of how to prepare a vegetable dish consisting of carrots and leeks, cooked in a little water and butter. They had just sliced the vegetables and put them in the saucepan, and Paula said to Adam: *And what do you think she's going to do next?* Then she answered her question herself: *She will simmer them gently. For about ten minutes.*

The sentence that we looked at in Chapter 3 was the second one, but I added a note to say that each of the other two contained points of interest. With respect to the first - i.e. *And what do you think she's going to do next?* - we have seen how to handle the initial *and* (Chapter 12), and *be going to* and *what .... doing?* (both in Chapter 14), and Chapter 19 has shown how to handle the possible ellipsis in the sentence *For about ten minutes*. In the present chapter we shall deal with the problem of how best to analyze the words .... *what do you think ...*

The problem here is that *what*, which indubitably occurs in the topmost clause, is also the Mex to the M *doing* in the clause that is embedded as the Phenomenon in the Process of 'thinking'. This is in fact an example of the seventh XXX CHECK type of construction that will be discussed in this chapter (so that it will not be dealt with for a while) - but it nonetheless illustrates a general theme that recurs throughout the chapter. This is that the explanation of some constructions involves the analysis of TWO CLAUSES at TWO DIFFERENT LAYERS OF THE STRUCTURE - and this presents special problems to the syntax analyst.

#### **1 Construction 1: evaluative enhanced theme**

##### ***It + be + evaluative Attribute + Carrier filled by that/to/-ing clause***

XXX Compare the treatment of this construction in my paper 'The semantic systems for "theme" in English'

Make sure I cover the following (from that paper):

Here, then, are Quirk et al's examples (from p. 1392) - but with their order rearranged to bring out the features that they have in common from a functional viewpoint. I have added one additional example (X2b), in order to show the link between two of their examples which I treat as similar. And I have added certain items and elements to the forms of (X4a) and (X4b), these all being elements that might have been present but which are unrealized in the versions used in Quirk et al

1985. Finally, I have added a linear analysis of the elements of the matrix clause, in which all of the elements have been introduced in previous analyses.

(X1) It [S] was on the news [C/At] that income tax is to be lowered [C/Ca].

(X2a) It [S] surprised [M] me [C/Em] to hear him say that [C/Ph].

(X2b) It [S] amuses / angers / annoys / delights / displeases / pleases / satisfies / upsets [M] Ivy [C/Em] that Fiona is so cheerful all the time [C/Ph].

(X2c) It [S] makes [M] her [C/Em] happy [MEx] to see everyone enjoying themselves [C/Ph].

(X3) It [S] doesn't matter (to me [C/Em]) what she said [C/Ph].

(X4a) It [S] is said (by some [C/Ag]) that she slipped arsenic into his tea [C/Ph].

(X4b) It [S] was considered / thought (by the authorities [C/Cog]) (to be) impossible for anyone to escape [C/Ph].

This is not the place to set out a full justification for the analysis of each of these examples, but a few comments are required in order to explain the approach that I am suggesting here to cases such as these. The first thing that strikes one about them is that most, like the earlier analysis of (62), cannot be accounted for in terms of the choice in the 'attributive' system shown in Figure 2 - for the simple reason that because MOST ARE NOT 'ATTRIBUTIVE' PROCESSES.

Interestingly, in only one of Quirk et al's examples is the Process 'attributive', and that is (X1). (Indeed, one might initially assume that (X1) is not 'attributive' but 'locational'. But notice that the meaning of the words *on the news* in (X2) is not that it tells us the Location of the proposition 'that income tax is to be lowered', but 'how valid' the proposition is - so that this is in fact a simple case of an evaluative enhanced theme construction, like most of those we have been considering so far.

Now consider (X2a) and (X2b). All the variants included in (X2b) are 'emotion' Processes, so they have an Emoter (Em) and a Phenomenon (Ph). But almost all of them also have a close conceptually equivalent version, e.g. for (X2a) *It is surprising that ...*, and for (X2b) *It is amusing / annoying / delightful / unpleasant / pleasant / satisfying / upsetting that ...*. The analysis of (X2c) - where 'MEx' stands for 'Main Verb Extension' - shows that I am treating *make ... happy* as a phrasal verb that is essentially similar to the simple verb *please* - as indeed its ability to use of this construction suggests that it is. (Note that in all of these cases the Participant Roles meet the standard tests, as set out in Chapter 2 of Fawcett forthcoming b.) In (X3) *It matters / doesn't matter (to me) that ...* is equivalent to *It is/isn't important (to me) that ...* - which would of course be a simple evaluative enhanced theme construction. Then in (X4a) and (X4b) the two full versions of the examples shown here illustrate a few of the many ways in which a Performer may distance herself from offering a full endorsement the validity of the proposition by assigning it the status of a **report**. The validity thus depends on one's confidence in the authority of the originator of the report. In these examples the word *said*, *thought* or *considered* is handled as an Auxiliary Extension (XEx), where the Auxiliary (X) is the preceding form of *be*. For the full justification of this analysis and similar problematical items (and associated extensions of the concept) see Chapter 14 of Fawcett forthcoming a.

I have scoured texts for counter-examples to the claim that there is always some

type of evaluation in examples of this construction, and the best that I have found is that in (X5a).

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There is one major central type of this construction, but there are also several structural variations on what is essentially the same general type of meaning. We shall term this general type of meaning the **evaluative enhanced theme**. We shall begin with the central type, which corresponds to the informal structural description given above, and then towards the end of this section we shall consider a number of variants. These express essentially the same

Examples:

It is obvious / clear that Ike wants a pizza.  
It's quite possible that he may be late.  
It's nice to see you.  
It was nice seeing Ivy again.  
It was easy to see the stains.  
It was a pleasure to see Ivy again.  
It is unclear whether Ike wants a pizza.

The constructions exemplified above can be related systematically to a set of simpler constructions, as follows:

- (1a) That Ike wants a pizza is obvious.
- (1b) It is obvious that Ike wants a pizza.
- (2a) That he may be late is quite possible.
- (2b) It's quite possible that he may be late.
- (3a) To see you is nice.
- (3b) It's nice to see you.
- (4a) Seeing Ivy again was nice.
- (4b) It was nice seeing Ivy again.
- (5a) To see the stains was easy.
- (5b) It was easy to see the stains.
- (6a) To see Ivy again was a pleasure.
- (6b) It was a pleasure to see Ivy again.
- (7a) Whether Ike wants a pizza is unclear.
- (7b) It is unclear whether Ike wants a pizza.

It is the first of each pair that reflects more closely the **logical form** that is common to both. Let us look more closely at the first example. The analyses of (1a) and (1b) are as shown in Figure 1:





Figure 1: The evaluative enhanced theme construction (1b) and its equivalent without an enhanced theme (1a)

The major structural difference between (1a) and (1b) is that the Subject in (1b) is an empty Subject, shown as S directly expounded by the item *it*. As with other empty Subjects, the word *it* has no referent, so that you cannot, for example, ask *What is obvious that Ike wants a pizza?* The two functions served by *it* are (a) to contribute to the expression of MOOD - as always with the Subject - and (b) to contribute to the 'thematic buildup' - a concept which I shall explain shortly.

But in terms of their Participant Roles Examples (1a) and (1b) have a great deal in common. The Carrier in both is the embedded clause *that Ike wants a pizza*, and the Attribute in both is *obvious*. In other words, the experiential meaning of both sentences is that the proposition 'that Ike wants a pizza' is 'obvious'.

In functional terms, we can say that the difference between the two sentences is that in (1b) the Attribute (i.e. *obvious*) has been given the status of **Enhanced Theme**. We have been familiar with the concept of **Subject Theme** since the early chapters of this book (e.g. *penicillin* in *Penicillin was discovered by Fleming* or *Fleming* in *Fleming discovered penicillin*), and we have met several other types of theme since then. The 'enhancement' in an Enhanced Theme is achieved by the combination of two structural devices. The first is familiar from the types of theme

that we have already considered, and it is simply that the Attribute is placed at an early position in the clause (but never, in this case, in the initial position). The second is that the Performer warns the Addressee to expect this theme by a 'thematic build-up', as we shall call it. This consists of the introduction of an empty Subject *it*, followed by, typically, a form of the verb *be*.<sup>a</sup> And, the side effect of this is that, since the Subject cannot have a PR conflated with it, a second Complement is introduced and the Carrier is conflated with it.<sup>b</sup>

We have now given the first part of the functional explanation of this construction, but we still need to answer the question 'Why would a Performer choose to use this construction rather than the simpler one in (1a)?'

In the case of a pair of clauses such as the two analyzed in Figure 1, what is happening is that a **single logical form** is being arranged in **two different syntactic constructions**. The logical form corresponds fairly closely to (1a) - so closely, in fact, that for our present purposes we can take (1a) as representing it. Thus we shall represent the logical form as, simply, 'Ike wants a pizza.' But it is the construction with the enhanced theme, of course, that is by far the more frequent. The question is: "Why is this preferred?" The answer is that it gives effect simultaneously to **three** of the four principles introduced in the last chapter, all of which P is likely to want to apply in the case of an evaluative enhanced theme construction.

### **The functional reasons for choosing this construction**

Let's now examine this construction from the viewpoint of those principles. We begin the explanation with the fact that the Carrier is not filled by a **nominal group**, realizing a 'thing' as it typically would be, but by an referent-as-role-in-situation construction, and so a **clause**. At this point we invoke Principle 2. According to this principle, it is likely that an element with relatively greater semantic **weight** will be presented at the **end** of the clause, and so be in the position where, if there is no contrastively new element, it is most likely to contain the explicit marker of **new** information.

Since, in our case, the Carrier is filled by a clause, the relevance of the principle is clear. But notice that the 'weight' and 'newness' of the material in the clause is not sufficient, on its own, to trigger this construction. That is, we do not take **EVERY** semantically heavy Carrier and put it at the end of a clause.

Principle 3 is also at work in cases such as this - and it neatly complements Principle 2. Why should P wish to make Attributes such as those in examples (1a) to (7) the Theme - and moreover to make them Enhanced Themes? The answer, as will be clear from the name given to this construction, is that they are all **evaluative**. Thus they all express P's evaluation - either of the **validity** of the claim expressed in the clause or in terms of P's **affective** (i.e. emotional) reaction to the content of the clause. Indeed, the 'obviousness' meanings are essentially validity meanings (at the 'high validity' end of the scale) that carry an additional meaning (which we will return to when we classify the types of meaning that occur as the Evaluative Enhanced Theme). But the purest cases are those where P directly expresses an emotional evaluation, as with *nice* in *It was nice seeing Ivy again*. The most basic concept in explaining why elements of clauses are thematized is that they are all MATTERS OF CONCERN TO THE PERFORMER - and nothing concerns P more than his/her own feelings. It is entirely natural, then, that affective meanings

and other evaluative meanings should be chosen by P to be thematized.<sup>c</sup>

It is the co-occurrence of the application of Principles 2 and 3 that creates the very strong likelihood that the particular combination of meanings will result in an evaluative *it*-construction. In other words, the effect of arranging the material in the form *It is obvious that Ike wants a pizza* is that it presents the Attribute *obvious* as the clause's **enhanced theme**, and in so doing underlines P's personal involvement in evaluating the claim expressed in the clause.

Finally, I should point out that, while it is Principles 2 and 3 that trigger this construction, it also satisfies the 'lower level' principle of Principle 1 - the **Get the pivotal element in soon** principle. This confluence of the three principles provides an overwhelming motivation to the Performer to use this construction. In the present case, however, Principle 3 has no more than a supporting principle. Here, the 'pivotal element' is the Main Verb, but we shall shortly see it at work in relation to the head of the nominal group.

## The range of types of evaluative Attribute

### XXX Trial taxonomy:

X1 validity (Lemke's 'warrantability / probability'); Francis' modality, truth)

pure validity

obviousness (Lemke's 'comprehensibility / obviousness')

commonness (Lemke's 'usuality', following Halliday)

normality (?Lemke's 'normativity')

rationality (adopted from Francis)

X2 affective

pure affective Performer's emotional response (Lemke's 'desirability')

social judgement = 'social desirability'

(Lemke's 'normativity' / 'appropriateness?', and his 'seriousness?')

importance (Lemke's 'importance / significance');

Lemke's *It is important that John came*

X3 experiential-affective

emotional response

(adopted from a minor category in Biber et al; Lemke lumps it in with

'desirability' - wrongly; incl Lemke's 'humorousness')

behavioural

difficulty

(not in Lemke's taxonomy, apparently because it is 'actional'; = Francis'

ability?)

necessity Lemke's *It is important that John come*

In what follows we shall concentrate on the types of meaning that are expressed in the adjectives at the apexes of such groups, and we shall note occasional cases where the Attribute is not filled by a quality group, but a nominal group.

It is important to note that the entity which the Performer wishes to evaluate is not an object, but an **event** - and very often it is an event that is being regarded as a

'proposition'.

## **X1 Validity**

### X1.1 Types of validity

The concept of 'validity' (which was first introduced in Chapter 4) is an expression of the level of confidence of the Performer in the validity of the claim made in the clause. In Chapter 4 we were considering the expression of 'validity' in Operators such as *may* and *must*, and in Chapter XXX in Adjuncts such as *perhaps*, *definitely* and *probably*. But in the type we are considering here it is expressed in the Attribute - typically, in the word that expounds the apex of the quality group that fills an Attribute that is conflated with a Complement. But it may also be a nominal group and, as we shall see, very occasionally some other unit.

Many of the most frequent adjectives that are used in this construction express the 'validity' type of 'evaluation' (Biber et al 1999:670-4) - even though the range of the next most frequent type, that of 'affective' meaning, is far greater. The six most frequent expressions of 'validity' are *clear*, *likely*, *unlikely*, *possible*, *impossible* and *true*. We shall therefore begin with the **validity** meanings. Here we shall distinguish between 'pure validity' and certain other types, and we shall find that some of these stretch the meaning of 'validity' beyond its real sense. But all of them provide an evaluation of the likelihood or frequency or reasonableness that something is so.

### X1.2 Probability (= pure validity)

The relatively 'pure' types of 'validity' meaning express **probability**. At the 'complete validity' end of the continuum we find items such as *certain*, *definite*, *indisputable*, *indubitable*, *inevitable* and *true*. A little short of 'certainty' we find *likely* and *probable*, and in the middle we find *possible*. Towards the 'invalid' end we find *doubtful*, *improbable*, *uncertain* and *unlikely*, and right at the 'invalid' end we find *false*, *impossible*, *inconceivable* and *untrue*.

But such meanings can also be expressed in a nominal group, such as *the case*, *a fact*, *the fact*, *the truth* and *a lie*. And we will also find an occasional prepositional group at this place in structure, as in *It's beyond question / (any) doubt, that ...*

### X1.3 Obviousness

One frequently used subtype of 'validity' is **obviousness**. At the 'obvious' end of this range of meanings we find adjectives such as *apparent*, *clear*, *evident*, *natural*, *plain*, *predictable* and *well-known*. We may even find a clause in this element, as in the case of *(only) to be expected*. Towards the middle of the scale come items such as *unsurprising* and *noticeable*, and at the other end of the scale we find items expressing 'unexpectedness', including: *amazing* (in one of its three possible meanings) *curious*, *exceptional*, *extraordinary*, *funny* ('funny peculiar'), *miraculous*, *mysterious*, *novel*, *odd*, *peculiar*, *remarkable*, *strange*, *surprising*, *unclear*, *unconventional*, *unexpected*, *unpredictable*, and *unusual*. Nominal groups

include a *puzzle*, a *surprise* and a *wonder*, e.g. *It was a bit of a miracle / surprise to find ...*. And note too *It was no wonder that the prince fell in love at first sight..<sup>d</sup>* And at the ‘unexpectedness’ end of the scale we also find words that began their life as ‘emotional response’ evaluations, but which have come, over time, to be used in the sense of the ‘obviousness’ type of ‘validity’. These include: *amazing*, *astonishing*, *astounding*, *odd*, *peculiar*, *puzzling*, *shocking*, *staggering*, *surprising*.

To point out that a proposition is *obvious* is not simply to say that it definitely is the case; it carries an additional meaning, which is to imply that anyone who can't see that it is so is a fool. And if the clause is in the present tense, as in *It's obvious that ...*, ‘anyone’ includes the Addressee. An ‘obviousness’ meaning is therefore ‘evaluative’ in two ways: (a) it evaluates the validity of the proposition and (b) it carries the conditional evaluation that, if anyone, including the Addressee, were to be foolish enough to disagree with the Performer, she/he would be stupid.

Rather similar considerations apply to expressions of ‘unexpectedness’. In addition to the Performer’s apparently objective assessment of the validity of the proposition, there is also P’s expression of surprise that it should be so.

Finally, notice that two of these expressions - those with *doubtful* or *unclear* at the apex of the quality group - require a different Binder other than *that*, as in (7a):

(7a) It is unclear / doubtful whether Ike wants a pizza.

#### X1.4 Commonness (= ‘degree of probability because of degree of frequency’)

This type of meaning is close to that of the Usuality type of Adjunct, but it is in fact distinct. Only a few of the many items that occur as Usuality Adjuncts have an equivalent adjective that can be used in this construction with a meaning that expresses how common the event is. This type of evaluation, unlike the next, can be applied to all types of events.<sup>1</sup>

The ‘commonness’ adjectives range along a scale that includes *common*, *uncommon*, *rare* and *unique*.<sup>2</sup>

#### X1.5 Normality

These evaluations are of events that are ‘behaviour’ rather than ‘propositions’. They express a position on the scale of ‘normality’ that says how far the Performer

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1. Very occasionally we find an example where it is hard to decide whether it is a case of this construction or Construction 2. Sometimes a construction with a ‘usuality’ meaning appears more like an evaluative enhanced theme construction rather than experiential enhanced theme construction, e.g. as in *It isn't often that Ike wants a pizza*. An example such as *It is every Friday that they have fish and chips* is a clear case of Construction 2, because there is a referential entity ‘every Friday’. But what about an example such as *It isn't often that Ike wants a pizza?* Is this the same construction as *It's rare that Ike wants a pizza?* The pragmatic implications of *It isn't often that ...* and *It's rare that ...* are very similar, but I suggest that this is a case of the ‘near-equivalence’ of two meanings that are derived from DIFFERENT sets of options in the lexicogrammar. Note that one is ‘positive’ and one ‘negative’ - and that POLARITY is a separate dimension of variation. We therefore treat an example such as *It isn't often that Ike wants a pizza* in the same way as *It's often that Ike wants a pizza*, and so as a case of Construction 2. But *It's rare that Ike wants a pizza* is treated as being like *It's unusual that Ike wants a pizza*, and so is an example of Construction 1.

believes that some behaviour conforms to the expected social norm. I have placed them here, interpreting them as expressing a degree of 'validity,' and indeed also typically 'probability', on the basis of the assumption (which is not always correct) that what is normal is what is most common, and what is most common is most probable. These items might also seem to fit the 'social judgement' category, which we have placed under the general heading of 'affective', because the expressions found there are highly generalized and can be applied to any type of event, whereas those listed here are restricted to behaviour.

Some general adjectives include *normal*, *usual* and *unusual*. Thus adjectives that appear to express Some that refer specifically to norms of social behaviour are, at the socially favoured and so (it is assumed) the more likely end of the scale are *decent* and *respectful*, and at the other end *cheeky*, *impertinent*, *indecent*, and *rude*. An interesting point about the last subset is that they can occur in the pattern of *It was polite of X to ...*, as well as the more frequent patterns of *It was polite (for X) to ... {in those days}*.

## X1.6 Rationality

The adjectives that express this type of meaning state the degree of the Performer's confidence in the strength of reasoning behind some proposition or some behaviour. They answer the questions 'Is it supported by good arguments?' and, in the case of behaviour: 'Is it a sensible course of action?' So these qualities are on a scale of 'rational' to 'irrational' - though at the 'irrational' end of the scale the items that express the irrationality merge into the unfavourable emotional response that the irrationality may arouse, so bringing the meaning of items such *absurd* very close to a type of 'emotional response' (which is categorized here as an 'experiential-affective' meaning; see Section X3.2 below).<sup>e</sup>

With respect to either a proposition or behaviour, the items at the 'rational' end of the continuum include *believable*, *credible*, *logical*, *rational*, *reasonable*, etc. Note however that, as with other types of evaluation, the place of such items on the continuum can be drastically altered by the addition of temperer such as *utterly*, *fairly*, *just* and *barely*.

In the middle of the continuum we find: *comprehensible*, *conceivable*, *defensible*, *understandable*, *plausible* and *tenable*.

Towards the 'irrational' end there are items such as *controversial*, *debatable* and *questionable*.

At the 'irrational' end of the continuum the items include: *absurd*, *illogical*, *incomprehensible*, *inconceivable*, *incredible*, *indefensible*, *irrational*, *ludicrous*, *preposterous*, *unbelievable*, *unreasonable* and *unthinkable*.

Some items are used regularly in the evaluation of the extent to which the subset of events that are behaviour are 'rational' (so that they occur less naturally with propositions). These include, at the 'rational' end, *sensible* and *wise*; in the middle: *feasible*; and at the 'irrational' end: *foolish*, *idiotic*, *laughable*, *meaningless*, *pointless*, *ridiculous*, *senseless*, *stupid*, etc. These border on the set of 'experiential-affective' terms terms that are used to evaluate behaviour listed in Section X3.4.

A few types of meaning that express other aspects of the 'rationality' of the event (whether a proposition or behaviour) include: *ironic* and *paradoxical*.

## X2 Affective evaluations

### X2.1 Types of affective meaning

When the qualities of 'validity' occur in a text, they almost always apply to an event rather than an object. But there is a second major group of items that occur very frequently in this construction, and these are used equally frequently with both objects and events. These are the **affective** qualities (*nice* and *nasty*, *right* and *wrong*, etc.). In other words, you can like or dislike either an object or an event, and English provides an extremely rich array of words to express feelings that express either 'favour' or 'disfavour'. As with the 'validity' meanings, there are 'purely affective' expressions and also ones that have other overtones.

### X2.2 Purely affective

The 'purely affective' group of meanings have the interesting inter-related characteristics that (a) each generation (or less) of children invent or adopt a new range of them, (b) they are associated with specific social groups (defined by social class, gender ethnicity etc as well as age), and (c) they are subject to individual preference.

The PURELY affective expressions simply express the Performer's feelings towards the event expressed in the embedded clause. However, while the major dimension of variation is the strength of feeling, some items typically occur with

Adjectives that express the affective meaning of 'favour' (i.e. 'positive affect') include *amazing*, *awesome*, *brilliant*, *beautiful*, *exquisite*, *fabulous*, *fantastic*, *fascinating*, *fine*, *glorious*, *gorgeous*, *grand* (in Northern British English) *great*, *incredible*, *lovely*, *magnificent*, *marvellous*, *pleasant*, *remarkable*, *splendid*, *stupendous*, *stunning*, *superb*, *terrific*, *tremendous*, and *wonderful*. Rather less frequently, we find nominal groups filling the Attribute, as in *(It's) a (real) pleasure*, *an (absolute) delight*, *a joy* and *a (really) good / great thing*. Some items that were introduced in the 1990s include: (a) from ordinary experiential adjectives, *cool*, *neat* and - perhaps surprisingly in view of the established item *cool - hot*; (b) by shortening existing affective adjectives, *brill* and *fab*; and (c) by changing the stress pattern *wickI-ed*. Such introductions are inevitably short-lived.TTT

Some adjectives that express 'disfavour' (i.e. 'negative affect') include, as well as *nasty*, the following: *appalling*, *atrocious*, *awful*, *dreadful*, *frightful*, *ghastly*, *horrible*, *lousy*, *rotten*, *terrible*, *unpleasant*.. Nominal groups that express 'disfavour' include *(It's) a shame* and *a pity*. (These correspond to Lemke's 'desirability' dimension of semantic evaluation', Lemke 1998:36-40. Note that the item *desirable* itself is in fact not a 'purely affective' evaluation but a 'social judgement')

See Section X3.3 below for the major way in which we add to these meanings.

### X2.3 Social judgement

Some affective adjectives carry meanings of **social judgement**, on a scale of 'right' to 'wrong'. Items that express a favourable social judgement include, as

well as *good* and *right*., the following: *correct, desirable* (see the note above), *fair, preferable, appropriate, suitable*. Nominal groups serving the same function include as *a good thing* and *an advantage*.

Items that express an unfavourable social judgement - which as before are more numerous - include, as well as *bad* and *wrong*, the following: *crazy, incorrect, preposterous, ridiculous, silly, shameful, stupid, undesirable, unfair, unsuitable* and *wrong*. Equivalent nominal groups are *a bad / shameful thing, a shameful fact*, etc.

#### X.2.4 Importance

A further small set of adjectives is those that express meanings of degree of the **importance** of the event to some purpose (on a scale of ‘vital’ to ‘irrelevant’). An event may be important to an individual or to a social group, so we treat it here as type of ‘affective’ evaluation that is different from both ‘purely affective’ meaning and ‘social judgement’.

At the ‘vital’ end of the scale we find: *compulsory, crucial, critical, essential, imperative, necessary, obligatory, preferable* and *vital*. A little short of that there are: *advisable, important, notable, noteworthy* and *relevant*, and at the ‘irrelevant’ end we find: *immaterial, irrelevant, unimportant* and *unnecessary*.

### X3 Experiential-affective evaluations

#### X3.1 Types of ‘experiential-affective’ evaluation

The types of meaning to be considered next are ‘experiential’, but with strong ‘affective’ overtones.

#### X3.2 Emotional response

The meaning of a major class of adjectives that occur as the Evaluative Enhanced Theme describe an **emotional response**. However, we need to distinguish carefully between this type of meaning, which reports a predicted change in the ‘affective state’ of anyone who is aware of the event, and the ‘purely affective’ meanings considered above, in Section X1.3. As you will recall, the ‘purely affective’ meanings are presented as the feelings of the Performer (unless she indicates otherwise), but in a meaning of ‘emotional response’ the set of people who will experience the event includes, in principle, everybody. Thus the crucial difference is that the first type is a purely ‘affective’ meaning, while this type is essentially ‘experiential’. In other words, adjectives that express an emotional response refer to the effect of an event on someone’s feelings, just as does an ‘emotion’ Process such as ‘liking’ or ‘disliking’. If ‘emotion’ Processes are a type of ‘experiential’ meaning (as they undoubtedly are) so too are qualities that describe a similar emotional response. The following examples illustrate this point clearly.

However, having established the distinction, we shall then consider some cases of language change where items have recently crossed this boundary.

Adjectives that report a positive emotional response include: *amazing, amusing, astonishing, awful, delightful, encouraging, fortunate, funny* (‘funny ha ha’),

*incredible, interesting, lucky, pleasant, pleasing, striking, unbelievable.*

But, as with other categories where feelings are involved, the more numerous type report a negative emotional response, and these items include *alarming, annoying, depressing, disappointing, discouraging, disgusting, dreadful, embarrassing, extraordinary, foolish, frightening, irritating, terrifying, tragic, sad, scary, shocking, unfortunate, unlucky, upsetting* and *worrying*.

A small number of this class of adjectives report the emotional response to degrees of ‘obviousness’, ‘commonness, and ‘normality’, and these include, at the positive end of the scale, *reassuring*, and at the opposite end *bizarre, spooky, strange* and *weird*.

### X3.3 The movement of adjectives from ‘emotional response’ to ‘purely affective’

There is a steady movement, over time, of a few adjectives that at one stage serve the function of describing ‘emotional response’ to becoming a ‘purely affective’ meaning. Since the set of persons whose feelings are affected by the event include the Performer, it is easy to see how movement from one category of meaning to another may occur. One adjective that made the transition in the late 1990s is *awesome*, and it is now rare to find it used with its earlier ‘emotional response’ meaning. One that is taking longer to shake off its ‘emotional response’ meaning and that is still also in use with that meaning is *amazing*.

There is a particularly interesting pair of words which completed the transition long ago, and so can no longer be used in their earlier senses - but which have migrated to different poles of the ‘favorability’ continuum. Consider the use of *terrific* and *terrible* in *It's terrific that Ivy's coming* and *It's terrible that Ike isn't coming*. Strangely, the first has come to mean a strong form of ‘nice’ and the second a strong form of ‘nasty’. But now contrast these two with a word that shares the same root morpheme of *terr* but which has retained its full meaning of ‘affective effect’. Thus in *It's terrifying that Fred's coming* the word *terrifying* does indeed report the expected general emotional response to the event of ‘Fred’s coming’. Notice that the fact that we can reasonably infer that the set of people who will feel terrified includes the Performer does not mean that we interpret *terrifying* as expressing a ‘purely affective’ meaning. Thus the continuing existence in English of all three of *terrific, terrible* and *terrifying* - each with its different meaning - makes the point that ‘emotional response’ meanings are indeed different from ‘purely affective’ meanings.<sup>f</sup>

### X3.4 Behavioural

These both describe and evaluate the sub-set of events that are ‘behaviour’ - typically the behaviour of people, and they pass the test of occurring with *of you*, as in *It was .... of you to ...*

At the favourable end on the scale we find *big, brave, clever, courageous, decent, fair, generous, good, great, kind, lovely, nice, prudent, responsible, right, sensible, smart, sweet, thoughtful*, and *wise*, and at the unfavourable end we find, as usual, a larger group, including *absurd, arrogant, cheeky, childish, churlish, clumsy, cruel, disgraceful, disingenuous, foolish, gutless, hypocritical, immoral, improper, impudent, irrational, irresponsible, mean, naive, negligent, perverse,*

*presumptuous, rude, selfish, shameful, silly, stupid, thoughtless, unfair, unkind, unprofessional, unreasonable, unwise, unworthy and wrong.* As you will have noticed, many of these also occur in other categories, typically followed by a *that* clause. But when they do they do not evaluate behaviour, and they do not pass the test of *It was .... of you to ...*

Another small set express 'typicality': *characteristic, typical, uncharacteristic* and *untypical*.

(based on Francis et al p. 501)

(includes QQQQ)

### X3.4 Difficulty

Another group of words that occur in this construction are those that express the performer's evaluation of the **difficulty** of carrying out the event. These adjectives include *easy, hard, difficult, tough, tricky* and *problematical*. Two nominal groups that occur quite frequently with this construction are *a problem* and *a nuisance*, and others include *simplicity itself* and *a doddle*.

We know that these are essentially 'experiential' meanings because the equivalent items, when functioning as Adjuncts, are Manner Adjuncts (e.g. *easily, with difficulty*). But the evaluative element of their meaning is sufficiently strong to enable them to be used with the evaluative enhanced theme construction. In other words, 'evaluative' meaning is not restricted to the two main 'evaluative' strands of meanings, i.e. the validity and affective strands.

### X3.5 Necessity

Examples include (*It is*) *necessary that / to*, which is equivalent to 'you are / he is required to', etc., and *It is possible to...* (but not *that*), which is equivalent to 'you are / he is allowed to / have the ability to', etc.

### QQQ Conclude?

What units fill the Attribute?

So far we have assumed, for the most part, that the Attribute is a 'quality', such as *obvious, possible* or *good*, and that it is filled by a quality group. But we have also noted cases where a nominal group is used to express essentially the same concept, and (8a and b) and (9a and b) illustrate two such cases:

- (8a) That Ike wants a pizza is a fact. (8b) It is a fact that Ike wants a pizza.  
(9a) To see you is a pleasure. (9b) It is a pleasure to see you.

In the second of each pair the nominal groups *a fact* and *a pleasure* are both Attributes that have been given the status of enhanced theme ('validity' in the first case and 'affective effect' in the second). Other common nominal groups include *It's a pity that ..., It's a shame that ... , It's a good thing that ....., It's a damned lie that ..., It's a mistake to ..., It's a problem that ....., etc.*

In most of the examples presented so far, the head of the nominal group has

expressed the 'evaluation'. But, as you might expect, it is possible to have a neutral noun as the head if the evaluation is expressed elsewhere - as in (10a) and *It's a great idea to make a list first*.

(10a) That he's coming is a good thing. (10b) It's a good thing that he's coming.

Finally, in examples such as *It was an exciting / a dangerous experience to descend the river on a raft*, the quality is clearly both **experiential and evaluative**. Such cases are common, and we therefore need to allow for these too.

### **The 'source' of the construction (and an alternative approach)**

To complete the discussion, I should refer briefly to the fact that, in grammars influenced by the transformational tradition, this construction is analyzed as what is termed an 'extraposition' construction. Here we have not used this name for the construction. The problem with the term 'extraposition' is that, in an example such as *It is obvious that Ike wants a pizza* (1b), the name implies that the Carrier *that Ike wants a pizza* was 'originally' at the front of the clause, as it is in (1a), and that it was then 'extraposed', i.e. moved from what is assumed to be its initial position to a position that is 'outside' the original clause, at the end (hence the term 'extraposition', from the Latin 'extra', meaning 'out of'). So, in the transformational approach, the grammar FIRST generates one construction, and THEN turns it into another, by applying a transformational rule.<sup>g</sup>

In SFG the goal is to generate the appropriate structure straight away, and this, if it can be done, is clearly preferable. And it has now been shown that it can be done.<sup>h</sup> In the approach to the evaluative enhanced theme construction taken here, we regard this 'special construction' as the direct result of a decision to arrange the elements of the **logical form** in one linguistic construction rather than another - this 'other' construction being the one found in *That Ike wants a pizza is obvious*. And this is done for the purposes suggested in the discussion of the relevant 'principles' introduced in the last chapter. It is, then, a 'transformation' in a sense, but one that is performed at the 'pre-linguistic' level of logical form. It makes no change to the logical structure, except to mark the Attribute as an Enhanced Theme. This is then realized, via the choices in the system networks, as the structure shown in Figure 1. The process is therefore very different from having a transformation that is performed at the level of syntax, as in transformational generative grammar (and those other types of grammar that still show its influence).

So far we have been looking at the basic version of this construction, as illustrated above. In such cases it is the Attribute that is evaluative, and it is filled by a quality group with an evaluative adjective at its apex - or, less frequently, by a nominal group with an evaluative noun at its head. But there is in fact quite a wide range of constructions in which the same basic principles of the evaluative enhanced theme construction are at work - but where the **evaluation** is achieved through different elements of clause structure. We shall now look briefly at these.

### **Construction 1a: It + Validity Modal + Process + Ø At + Ca**

Examples:

It may / must be that they aren't married.  
It may / might / could (just) be that they are engaged.

In **Construction 1a** the evaluation of **validity** is expressed not as a Attribute, as in Construction 1, but in a **modal verb** functioning as an Operator. By convention, users of the language agree that the unrealized Attribute has a meaning similar to 'the case' or 'true'. This results in an unusual type of clause, in which the Attribute is unexpounded, with the 'validity' meaning being expressed in the Operator.

Compare:

It [S] is [O/M] possible [C/At] that they are married [C/Ca]. (Construction 1)

It [S] may [O] be [M] the case [C/At] that they are married [C/Ca].  
(Construction 1)

It [S] may [O] be [M] Ø [C/At] that they are married [C/Ca]. (Construction 1a)

### **Construction 1b: It + Process + Ø At + Ca**

Examples:

It isn't that they are married.  
Is it that she doesn't love him?

In **Construction 1b** the evaluation of **validity** is completely implicit. As in Construction 1a, users of the language agree by convention that the unrealized Attribute has a meaning similar to 'the case' or 'true'. This too results in the unusual type of clause in which the Attribute is unexpounded - but in this case there is not overt item that signals the 'evaluation'.

Compare:

It [S] isn't [O/M] possible [C/At] that they are married [C/Ca]. (Construction 1)

It [S] isn't [O/M] the case [C/At] that they are married [C/Ca]. (Construction 1)

It [S] isn't [O] be [M] [Ø C/At] that they are married [C/Ca]. (Construction 1b)

A similar construction is found in examples such as:

It goes without saying that she is an excellent pianist.

The only difference is that in this case the Process is expressed as a Main Verb plus Extension - and the MEx is expounded by *without saying*. So the analysis is:

It [S] goes [M] without saying [MEx] that she is an excellent pianist [C/Ca].

In this case the MEx is filled by a clause that consists only of the Binder *without* and the Main Verb *saying*.<sup>3</sup> Compare

It [S] is [O/M] obvious [C/At] that she is an excellent pianist [C/Ca].

### **Construction 1c: It + emotive Process + Em + Ph**

Examples:

It amazes / disgusts / interests / pleases / saddens / surprises / upsets / worries her that they are aren't married.

It amazed (etc) her to discover / learn / realize / etc that Ivy isn't married.

It doesn't matter (to us) that they are aren't married.

It helped (us) that you know French.

It helps (you) to know French.

It takes [Pro] (me (a long time [Prex] to get to the station.

It costs (you) five pounds to get in.

(For the last two, cp cost in PR chapter)

In **Construction 1c** the evaluation is expressed through an emotive Process - and specifically one of the 'phenomenon-oriented' type. In such Processes the Phenomenon is the typical first PR, and so typically the Subject. The **End Weight** principle readily applies, and with an interesting effect. Once it becomes the final element, this leaves the emotive Process as the first lexically full item - so lending it some of the 'flavour' of being an 'evaluative theme'. In most cases the Emoter is almost obligatory, but the lexical verbs *matter* and *help* regularly occur without it. The analysis is as follows:

Compare:

It [S] is [O/M] surprising [C/At] that they aren't married [C/Ca] (Construction 1)

It [S] surprises [Pro] her [C/Em] that they aren't married [C/Ph]. (Construction 1c)

The role of *us* in *It helped us that you know French* may not at first sound much like an Émoter, but it is less odd than one might expect, surprisingly, to re-express it as *We had a good feeling about you knowing French*.

### **Construction 1d: It + make + Af-Ca + At + Ag filled by clause**

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3. The items *goes* and *saying* are generated by re-entering the part of the system network from which clauses are generated, with all the relevant choices being preselected.

Examples

It makes her sad / upset that they are married.

It makes her happy that they are married.

**Construction 1d** is essentially the same as Construction 1c, except that the **emotive Process** is repressed by *make* plus an Attribute expressing emotional response, such as *sad* or *happy*. The Agent of the change of feeling of the Affected-Carrier is, of course, the event referred to in the Phenomenon. Compare the following:

It [S] is [O/M] sad [C/At] that they quarrelled C/[Ca]. (as in Construction 1)

It [S] saddened [M] me [C/Em] that they quarrelled[C/Ph]. (as in Construction 1c)

It [S] made [M] me (C/Af-Ca) sad [C/At] that they quarrelled [C/Ag]  
(as in Construction 1d)

**Construction 1e: It + be + M + (to Af-Cog) <(by Ag)> Ph (=report) <(by Ag)>**

Examples:

It is said / reported / thought / believed / felt (by many people) that she can fly.

It has been reported (to me) (<by many people>) that she can fly (<by your parents>)

It is considered (to be) impossible for anyone to escape.

Just as one way of expressing one's confidence in the **validity** of a proposition is by presenting it simply as a **report** that it is so, so too reports can be used in a construction that is related, like all of those above, to the evaluative enhanced theme construction. Compare the following:

It [S] is [O/M] possible [C/At] that she can fly [C/Ca]. (as in Construction 1)

It [S] is [O/X] reported [M] that she can fly [C/Ph]. (as in Construction 1e)

This type of construction can include an overt specification of one or both of the communicating interactants, as in:

It [S] is [O/X] reported [M] to me [C/Af-Cog] by many [C/Ag] that she can fly [C/Ph].

**Note that, from the viewpoint of comparing the whole range of different ways of expressing VALIDITY, the above constructions also need to be related to the straightforward constructions**

exemplified in *They say that she can fly* (Chapter 10), *There's a rumour that she can fly* (Section 3 below), *She is said (by some) to be able to fly* (Section 4 below).

## 2 Construction 2: experiential enhanced theme

*It + be + At* (=PR/CR of congruent version of embedded clause) + Carrier filled by 'pseudo-relative' clause

**XXX The numbers of examples in this section need checking and tidying**

Examples:

- It is a pizza (that) Ike wants.
- It is you that / who Fred loves.
- It was that one which I really wanted.
- It was yesterday that / when she bought it.
- It was here that / where I put it.
- It was they that led the attack on the Bastille.

### **A comparison with the referent-as-role-in-event construction**

To understand the experiential enhanced theme construction it will be helpful to take as our starting point a construction that we first met in Chapter 16. This is the type of **incongruent** construction in which an referent (typically an object rather than an event) is specified in terms of its role in some event other than the present one: the **referent-as-role-in-event** construction, as in (1a):

(1a) What Ike wants is a pizza.

Compare (1a) with the example of Construction 2, i.e. the second of the special constructions with an empty Subject, as shown in (2):

(2) It is a pizza that Ike wants.

The analyses of (1a) and (2) are as shown in Figure 2:





Figure 2: The experiential enhanced theme construction (and the equivalent referent-as-role-in-event construction)

Figure 2 shows clearly a number of significant similarities between the **referent-as-role-in-event** construction, as introduced in Chapter 16 and as shown again in (2a), and the **experiential enhanced theme** construction, as introduced here.<sup>1</sup> Let's consider the similarities first, and then the differences.

The first similarity is that both sentences have a matrix clause with a Process of 'being', and that the participant roles of both are a Carrier and an Attribute. It is the fact that we give priority to this functional analysis of the experiential meaning of the construction - i.e. its TRANSITIVITY, in systemic functional terms - which provides the structural framework in which the similarities and differences between these two constructions can be clearly seen.

The second similarity is that, in both sentences, the portion which we might term the 'substantive' clause (expressing 'Ike's wanting something') is embedded as the Carrier. This is the clause that would be used in a fully **congruent** version of the logical form of the event.

We come now to the differences between the two. The major difference, from the viewpoint of the functional structure, is that in (6) *a pizza* has been made the Enhanced Theme. From a more general functional viewpoint, there is the important difference that the enhanced theme construction in (7) can be used very much more freely than the referent-as-role-in event construction in (7). One can take almost ANY experiential role in an event - a participant, circumstantial or temporal role - and make it the enhanced theme of the construction. But in the referent-as-role-in-event construction there is the apparently unmotivated limitation that **human beings** are not normally referred to through the use of this construction (unless it is introduced by *whoever*) while non-human objects regularly. (Fawcett (in preparation a) suggests some reasons which may help to explain this odd fact.)

A relatively trivial difference between (6) and (7) is that in the enhanced theme construction the element which introduces the embedded clause most frequently is *that*. This is an item which, in Standard English, is different from the equivalent most frequent item, i.e. *what*, in the referent-as-role-in-event construction. Note, however, that in some dialects of English you can say *It's a pizza what Ike wants*, and in such cases the form expresses the view of function shown in our analysis. Another relatively trivial difference is that in (6) the 'relative pronoun' is frequently absent in the construction, as Figure 2 illustrates. We call these differences 'relatively trivial', because they are matters of (a) INTERNAL structure, and (b) of FORM - whereas in our approach we give priority to relations that are (a) EXTERNAL (without ignoring the internal ones) and (b) FUNCTIONAL (without ignoring the formal ones). Many grammarians, as we have seen, refer to the embedded clause in this construction as if it were a sub-type of 'relative clause' - so implying that it is similar to the clause *that Ike wants* in *The food that Ike wants is a pizza*. But the word 'relative' only makes sense in a functional grammar if it is prefixed by 'pseudo-', and it is better to avoid it altogether, since it smacks too strongly of the 'transposition' analysis. Thus, although the internal form of an embedded clause such as *that Ike wants* in (6) appears to be that of a relative clause - and although it shares some other structural characteristics with genuine relative clauses - the fact is that in the functional approach presented here such clauses do not fill the qualifier of a nominal group. Instead, they fill the Carrier of the matrix clause, in the way illustrated in Figure 2.

### **A comparison with the evaluative enhanced theme construction**

Let's now look at the **similarities with Construction 1**. How far do the same basic principles introduced in the last chapter apply here too? First, both this construction and Construction 1 begin with an empty Subject (S directly expounded by *it*). Second, the matrix clause in both has a Process of 'being', and the two PRs of a Carrier and an Attribute. Third, each has an Enhanced Theme (here the Attribute *a pizza* and there the evaluative Attribute *obvious*). But here the similarities cease.

There are also significant **differences from Construction 1**. In the **evaluative** enhanced theme construction, the embedded clause is presented as a full proposition, and its status as such is marked by the fact that item which introduces it is the Binder *that*.. But the item *that* which so regularly occurs in the

**experiential** enhanced theme construction is NOT a Binder. It is a 'relative pronoun', as is shown by the fact that *who* can be substituted for it, if the referent is human. And, as the use of a relative pronoun always signifies, the proposition is incomplete. For example, in *It is obvious that Ike wants a pizza*, the clause *Ike wants a pizza* is complete, while in *It's Ike that wants a pizza*, the clause *that wants a pizza* is incomplete. This is the first significant difference. The second is that the function of the matrix event in an evaluative enhanced theme construction is to classify the proposition in the embedded clause as being 'obvious', 'nice', 'possible', etc. Thus the Attribute of the matrix clause is always an 'evaluation' of the proposition in the embedded clause. But the Attribute in the matrix clause of an experiential enhanced theme construction contains no such 'evaluation', and it consists instead of the element of the embedded proposition that is missing, and that is being presented as the Enhanced Theme.]

### **Adding informational meaning: 'New' and 'Contrastively New'**

So far I have said nothing about the possible relevance of the end weight principle. We can see the reason by looking again at (2b). Here the Carrier *that Ike wants* has clearly NOT been placed at the end of the clause in order to receive the unmarked Tonic. This could not be the case, because a **Contrastive Tonic**, signifying that the element concerned is being presented as **Contrastively New** information, has been placed on the Enhanced Theme itself.

At this point we need to remind ourselves of a couple of the basic facts about intonation and the meanings it realizes, as summarized in Section 4 of the last chapter. First, in the case of a sentence with a single matrix clause there may well be just one **information unit** containing just one element explicitly marked as **New**, and so just one **intonation unit** with just one **Tonic**. Typically it will be a **Nuclear Tonic**, which carries a meaning of MOOD, and it will come on the last lexical item. But we also regularly find cases where an element is presented as **Contrastively New**, realized in a **Contrastive Tonic**, and occurring wherever the element to be contrasted occurs in the sentence. Thus *a pizza* in (2b) is BOTH the enhanced theme AND the element that is presented as contrastively new. The implication of speaking the sentence with a contrastive tone is that what Ike wants is a pizza and NOT, say, cannelloni or lasagne.

These facts explain why one of the major brewers of beer in the South Wales area of Britain, Brains, has for decades used Example (3) below as their main advertising slogan:

(3) It's Brains you want.

Quite apart from the pun on the company's name, this arrangement of the clause presents the word *Brains* - which is clearly the one which the advertisers want to have the maximum impact on the reader - as BOTH the enhanced theme AND the contrastively new element. In other words, the clear suggestion is that you do NOT want Hancocks, or Welsh Bitter, or any of Brains' other rivals in the South Wales area.

## Variation in intonation within the embedded clause

However, the picture of the patterns of intonation in the experiential enhanced theme construction is not quite as simple as I have suggested so far - and for two reasons. The first is because there is variation - but of a fully predicatable type - within the type of enhanced theme construction that we have been discussing so far - the type where the Enhanced Theme is Contrastively New. The second complication is the fact that there is a semantically distinct second type of experiential enhanced theme construction. We shall take the internal variation first.

Grammarians sometimes suggest that the embedded clause that fills the Carrier in this construction (here *what Ike wants*) is always 'given' information. If it were always 'given' (in Halliday's sense of the term, which I shall assume here to be the most useful sense of the term) it would be presented as 'recoverable information', and so spoken as part of the 'tail' following the Tonic - typically on a continuously low pitch in the case of an 'information giver'. But in fact, when we use such constructions in speech, we frequently give the material in the embedded clause a separate information unit, marking it as **supplementary information** by pronouncing its Tonic with a low-to-mid rising pitch. Thus the essential characteristic of the embedded clause is NOT, as is sometimes supposed, that it is 'given' (i.e. that it is fully recoverable information), but that it is **presupposed**. It is 'presupposed' in the sense that what it refers to is presented by the Performer as a belief that is shared by both the Performer and the Addressee. This 'shared belief' is typically evoked by using text in which some or all of the information is 'new' - 'new' in the sense that it is not obviously recoverable. So information may be BOTH **presupposed** (in the sense of 'shared beliefs') AND **recoverable**, at the level of the belief system - but it does not follow that because it is recoverable it is necessarily **given**, at the level of meaning, within the language system. The fact that the information is 'presupposed' is expressed by marking it as 'supplementary', i.e. by giving it a rising Tone. Perhaps it may be useful at this point to remind you of the diagram summarising these relationships (Figure 2 of the last chapter, presented below as Figure 1):




Figure 1: A simplified summary of the origins of the three types of Tonic  
(= Figure 2 of Chapter 21)

But sometimes it happens that the Performer can present ALL of the 'shared belief' information as fully recoverable. In such cases there is no need to present

the information as a separate information unit, and it can be treated as part of the 'tail' following the Contrastively New element. Consider examples (4) and (5) below. Here, the intonation is shown in the text, and the relevant types of meaning are shown beneath it. As an additional aid to interpreting these examples, the portion of the text containing the presupposed 'shared' information is underlined - though this category really belongs at the level of 'belief', as shown in Figure 1).

(4) It was Fred (CT/1) that broke the vase I bought for my mother's birthday (T/2).

ETh  
CN presupposed and New (though 'supplementary')

(5) It was Fred (CT/1) that did it.

ETh  
CN presupposed and Given

Clearly, (4) would normally be spoken with a separate information unit for *that broke the vase I bought for my mother's birthday*, while (5) would normally be spoken with *that did it* as the 'tail' following the contrastive Tonic on *Fred*. The longer the embedded clause is, the more likely it is to contain semantic material that is deemed necessary for the Addressee. And, if it does, it will be given a separate information unit - together with, typically, a Tone which marks it as conveying 'supplementary information'. This fact demonstrates that the information in such embedded clauses is typically NOT presented as 'given' (as some grammarians seem to have assumed). In other words, the case where the embedded clause is presented as 'given' is just a special case of what is typically presented as supplementary information. Thus, while we have here TWO patterns of intonation, the difference is INTERNAL TO THE EMBEDDED CLAUSE. So, in terms of types of experiential enhanced theme construction, they are of the same type.<sup>k</sup>

## Two types of experiential enhanced theme construction

The variation in intonation to which we come now presents a serious problem for those who maintain that this construction is always used contrastively. This is the fact is that in very many cases of this construction there is NOT a Contrastive Tonic on the Enhanced Theme. Instead the main tonic falls, as it would in a clause without an experiential Enhanced Theme, on a late item in the clause. The following are typical examples with the Enhanced Theme in boldface):

(6) It was **in eighteen seventy-nine** that the revolution finally began (NT/1).

(7) It was **then** that the seeds of American Independence were sown (NT/1).

(8) The women played an important role (T/2), in that it was **they** that led the attack on the Bastille (NT/1).

In none of these cases is there any meaning of contrast in the Enhanced Theme (*in eighteen seventy-nine*, *then*, and *they*), and in all three the natural place for the falling Nuclear Tonic is the end of the clause.<sup>l</sup> As such examples may suggest,



*is a pizza that Ike wants.*

This construction serves a number of different higher functions. The type with contrastive newness is used both for pointing up contrasts that are 'local', whether in the recent text or in the Addressee's presumed belief system (or 'knowledge'). But the construction is also used to re-introduce a 'main player' who has been mentioned earlier but whose reappearance at this point may be unexpected by the Addressee. Then there is the type without contrastive newness is used to 'set the scene' at the beginning of a discourse, as in *It was in 1789...* , and the cases where the Enhanced Theme is merely a pronoun and the major information comes in the referent-as-role-in-event that fills the Carrier, typically including the major tonic.

## **2b Reminder: why the referent-as-role-in-event construction is NOT a 'special construction'**

Examples:

What you see is this.

This what you see.

What you see is what you get.

This construction has in fact already been introduced, in Chapter 16. XXX  
ADD INTRODUCTORY MATERIAL FROM THERE.

It is, in full, a 'referent specified by its role in an event'.

This structure is not in fact a 'special construction' in terms of the syntactic analysis proposed here, so it is in a sense odd to treat it as one. We shall see shortly why it is included. In grammars influenced by the transformational tradition it is termed a 'pseudo-cleft' construction. An example is *What you see is this*. In the present approach the analysis is simply:

What you see [Ca] is [Pro] this [At].

It is true that the Carrier is filled by a clause, but this is not unusual. It is a case of a clause as an incongruent thing (see section 2.5.2). In other words, a *wh*-clause of this type may occur wherever a nominal group occurs typically - e.g. as a PR. Consider the following pairs:

(1a) Her remarks amused us.      (1b) What she said amused us.

(2a) Ivy wrote that other letter.      (2b) Whoever wrote this letter wrote that other letter.

(3a) That issue is not important.      (3b) Who he is is not important.

In all these cases the embedded clause fills a PR that is conflated with the Subject (a Phenomenon in (1b), and Agent in (2b) and a Carrier in (3b). But these incongruently realized things can occur anywhere where a full nominal group may occur, e.g. as an Affected-Carrier conflated with a completive in (4b) and a, Attribute in (5b).

- (4a) Give it to Ivy.           (4b) Give it to who you want.  
(5a) This is her new Powerbook. (5b) This what she had for Christmas.

So, at the stage of analysing the matrix clause, precisely the same analysis as that given above (i.e. Ca + Pro + At) should be given to both *This is what you see* and *What you see is what you get.*, as shown below:

There are some types of Process - and so some Main Verbs - with which it is unusual to find a thing realized as a clause introduced by *who*, *what*, *when* or *where*. But there are no restrictions if the form is *whoever*, *whatever*, *wherever* or *whenever*. In other words, the fact that a role is expressed by a clause does not affect the analysis. So in the terms of the framework presented here, this is in NOT a special construction.

So why does the question arise? What about the relationship between *What you see is this* and *You see this*? In transformational grammar this was handled as a syntactic transformation, and many grammars still reflect this tradition. But in the SFG approach presented here the equivalence between the two is expressed, as you will perhaps have guessed, as being at the level of **logical form**. In fact the relationship is exactly the same as that between *What Ike wants is a pizza* and *Ike wants a pizza*, which we considered above. In the present theory it is therefore not seen as the task of syntax to try to express this relationship, because it is more appropriately handled as the equivalence of two logical forms.

Footnote: reminder of the special case where it is not an 'entity-as-role-in-event' but 'predicate-as-role-in-event', e.g.

What he did was (to) resign.

What it does is (to) ignite the fuel.

What you have to do first is (to) read a lot of books about it.

(as also introduced in Ch 16 of Vol 1)

### **3 Construction 3: existential enhanced theme (new entity)**

**XXX Revise and tidy to avoid repetition and to get material on (1) discourse functions and (2) problems in appropriate sections.**

The typical function of this construction is to introduce a new entity to the discourse, and so to the mind of the Addressee, in such a way as to simply establish its existence in time and space - hence the word 'existential' in the construction's name.<sup>4</sup> Consider B's reply in (1):

(1)A: Have you got a beer in the house?

---

4. Such clauses are called 'existential' clauses in traditional grammar, for this reason. We will come shortly to the reason why we should regard such clauses as being another type of 'enhanced theme'.

B: There's one in the fridge.

It may at first seem that *one* in *There's one in the fridge* does NOT introduce a new entity - because A has already mentioned *a beer*. But A is referring to any possible member of the class of cans or bottles of beer, while B is referring to a specific can or bottle of beer. (Indeed, if B had been referring to an entity that had already been introduced he would have said *it* rather than *one*.) So the 'new entity' that this construction introduces to the discourse is not necessarily one whose typically associated noun has not been mentioned.

Now consider (2):

(2) There's a fly in my soup.<sup>5</sup>

In some cases of this construction, such as (2), the location in space is an important part of the message, but typically - and we will consider some exceptions shortly - the process type is the simple locational type found in *There's one in the fridge* and *There's a fly in my soup*.

### ***There + be + Carrier (+ Location)***

Here is a representative set of examples of this construction. We will begin with the more typical type, and then consider the others. Let's begin with (3a):

(3a) There's a spider in the bath!

How many Participant Roles are there in this clause? Clearly, there are two: the spider and the bath. But neither is the Subject, because the equivalent polarity seeker would be (3b) - so demonstrating that *there* is the Subject.

(3b) Is there a spider in the bath?

So the analysis is as in Figure XXX, and the item *there* has no referent, just as the item *it* has no referent in the other types of enhanced theme construction.

There 's a spider in the bath

Figure XXX

There were blokes throwing beer cans about in the square.

There were two seeded players beaten at Wimbledon.

There's a report that Dr Idle is an industrial spy.

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5. This single-clause text-sentence occurs in the old joke:

Customer in restaurant: Waiter, waiter! There's a fly in my soup!

Waiter (hurrying over): Shh! Be quiet or the other customers will be wanting one too!

There's going to be a fight.  
And then there's your sister.

When the meaning represented in the logical form is of a type that could be directly expressed by *A spider is in the bath*, there is a choice between a realization in *A spider is in the bath* and in the one found in *There's a spider in the bath*. The strong probability, of course, is that the realization will be in the second form. This is yet another type of 'enhanced theme' construction, but this time what is highlighted is the **existence** of a Carrier in a locational clause.

The PRs in such clauses are therefore always a Carrier and Location.<sup>n</sup> We might ask: 'Why, given that the function of the clause is simply to present some entity, should the Location be specified?' The answer is that every physical object has, by its very nature as a physical object, a physical location in space - and indeed in time. And since the major discourse function of this construction is to introduce a major new entity to the discourse, it is helpful to the Addressee to locate this new entity in time and space. Its location in time is typically recoverable from the preceding discourse, but its location in space is often less clear. When it is clear, we find cases with a covert Location, and when it is not - as naturally happens frequently, since the current physical (or abstract) scene may be large and complex - the fact that the construction is an adaptation of a simple locational Process, with a Carrier and a Location, makes it natural for the Performer to specify the Location.

This construction is traditionally known as the 'existential' construction. As this name suggests, it is in many cases possible to interpret such a clause as merely asserting the existence of an object - and as having nothing to say about that object's location. So should we set up TWO constructions - which we might call, say, the 'existential' *there*-construction (without a Location) and the 'locational' *there*-construction (with a Location)? There are good reasons why we should not, as we shall soon see. The position taken here, then, is that we should always allow for the presence of a **covert Location**.

Why, then, one might ask, are there so many cases where there is no overt Location? And aren't there cases where it isn't easy to supply the supposedly 'covert' Location - which would suggest in turn that we should allow for 'purely existential' clauses? Let's address the first question first.

Two reasons why a Performer (P) may decide to leave the Location covert are:

(1) A specific Location may be readily recoverable - either from the preceding discourse or from the context of situation - e.g. the covert Location in *there were two beers* in *When I last looked in the fridge, there were two beers*.

(2) The Location is so general that it is not worth specifying - as with *There are no living dodos (in the world)*.

With a **physical** object, which by its nature has an existence in both time and space, a covert Location is typically recoverable, e.g. for *There were two beers*. The same is often true of an **abstract** object when it is **reified**, i.e. when it is

being thought about with the help of a physical representation such as the tree diagram analysis of a sentence, as in *How many Participant Roles are there?* Here the Location to be inferred might be 'in the clause that we are discussing' or 'in English' (depending on the context). The analysis of such clauses is therefore as follows (showing the covert Locations in each in rounded brackets):

There are [Pro] two beers [Ca] (Loc).

How many Participant Roles [Ca] are [Pro] there (Loc)?

There are [Pro] two beers [Ca] in the fridge [Loc].

There are [Pro] two Participant Roles [Ca] in that clause [Loc].

The vast majority of objects that we refer to are **physical** objects, so the explanation given so far sets the general pattern. Sometimes, however, it is not so clear that there is a recoverable Location. The reason is often that the object being introduced is not a physical object, so that it has no physical location. Consider, for example, *Some years ago* (a Time position Adjunct) *there was a fashion for flared jeans*, and *There's a possibility/ report that Dr Idle is an industrial spy*. When the new object is **abstract** it may be less easy to quickly find a possible wording to describe the Location. Yet a moment's thought will usually provide an acceptable wording, as with *Some years ago there was a fashion for flared jeans among young people*, *There's a possibility that Dr Idle is an industrial spy in my mind* and *There's a report that Dr Idle is an industrial spy in the papers*. Indeed, **the possibility of adding words that would have been analyzed as a Location if they had been there in the first place demonstrates clearly that we must allow for this role even in cases where it is not expressed overtly**. It would be odd to have two different PR analyses, depending on whether there was or was not an overt Location. For this reason we treat those cases that may at first appear to be 'purely existential' as locational Processes with a covert Location - and their analysis is therefore Pro + Ca + (Loc).

Just as abstract objects are often presented with a covert Location, so too are **events**. In such cases the covert Location that we provide may well be a location in time, as in *There's going to be a fight (in a minute)*. Finally, there are cases such as *And then there's Fred*. The *there*-construction is quite frequently used to introduce members of a list of objects, and this is of course fully consistent with the basic reason for using this construction, i.e. to introduce a 'new' object to the discourse. The Location of the object is simply 'in the list of objects that are to be considered'. Indeed, one can even make the Location overt in such cases by saying *And then there's Fred in the list of people to consider*.

There are similar constructions with verbs such as *arise*, *come*, *exist*, *occur*, *remain*, etc, as in *After the night's drinking there came the hangover of the morning after*. But notice that even though some of these verbs also occur in other configurations of PRs to express 'motion', there is no motion in these cases: they are locational. And the same goes for 'follow' in *After the sonata there will follow the symphony*.<sup>o</sup>

## The discourse functions

The major discourse function served by this construction is to introduce a new entity - typically a new object - to the 'discourse world' that is being constructed by the contributors to the discourse - by the performer alone in a monologue, and by both the performer and the Addressee in interactive discourse. (The term 'object' includes persons and abstract objects, etc.) The emphasis is on the object IN ITS OWN RIGHT, and the expectation set up by using this construction is that it will be a major player in the events referred to in the subsequent stretch of discourse, and that it will therefore be referred to regularly.

It is important to recognize that an object that is 'new' in this sense is not necessarily one that has not been mentioned before. It is 'new' in the sense that it is not expected by the Addressee at this point. This explains the use of this construction to (re-)introduce members of a list, as in the last example above. Normally the referent will be unparticularized (which is roughly equivalent to 'indefinite' in traditional grammar terms) but in cases of additions to a list such as the last example the referent may be particularized, often being identified by name.

We should note, however, that this way of introducing an object that is new to the discourse is in contrast with another that is far more frequent. This occurs when P wishes to refer to an object that has not been mentioned so far, but which is not so important that it deserves to be identified simply as being present. An example would be *two beers* in *They had two beers and then went for a swim*. Here *two beers* is simply presented as a 'thing' that is not recoverable by A, and so as 'unparticularized'. The two beers are not key objects in the episode being described. But they could be presented as key if they were introduced thus: *There are two beers in the fridge*. Its analysis is as follows:

There are [Pro] two beers [Ca] in the fridge [Loc].

## Two problems

There remain (sic!) two small problems to which we shall now propose a solution. Grammarians influenced by the transformational tradition have suggested that all examples of this construction should be derived by a syntactic transformation from a simple clause, so that *There's a fly in my soup* should in this view be derived from *A fly is in my soup*.<sup>6</sup> While this seems an unnecessary complication to introduce

examples such as *There were blokes throwing beer cans* should be derived by a syntactic transformation from *Blokes were throwing beer cans*. Similarly, they would suggest that *There were two seeded players beaten in the first round at Wimbledon* should be derived from *Two seeded players were beaten in the first round at Wimbledon*. In the first of these two cases the form of *be* expounds the 'Period-marked' Auxiliary (the *be ...ing* form), and in the second it expounds the 'Passive' Auxiliary (the *be ...en* form). It has been argued that, because in such cases it is not a simple object that is being introduced but a complex event, the construction is different from the ordinary 'existential' construction.

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6. Strictly speaking, *There's a fly in my soup* would be said to be derived from the same deep structure as that from which *A fly is in my soup* is derived, but with an additional transformation.

How should such cases be handled? Is it the case that ANY form of the verb *be*, whether a main verb or an Auxiliary, can accept a transformation which introduces *there* as the Subject? In taking a functional approach to the problem, we ask: 'What are the Participant Roles of the various elements?' and 'What other functional roles may be involved?' Such questions lead us to relate our answers to other examples with the same configurations of roles. Let us take the first example, i.e. (1a):

(1a) There were blokes throwing beer cans.

We can capture important generalizations if we relate this NOT to *Blokes were throwing beer cans* but to (1b):

(1b) There were blokes who were throwing beer cans.

In other words, examples such *blokes throwing beer cans* are part of the very general pattern of the function of qualifiers in the nominal group. As simple cases of this consider (2a) and (2b), and (3a) and (3b). In both the pattern of our initial example appears in a very different syntactic context - but always as a nominal group with a qualifier:

(2a) I noticed some blokes throwing beer cans.

(2b) I noticed some blokes who were throwing beer cans.

(3a) Blokes throwing beer cans burst into the room.

(3b) Blokes who were throwing beer cans burst into the room.

Finally, notice the fact that the referent (i.e. the men throwing beer cans) may themselves be placed in a Location, as in (4), where the analysis has to be as shown:

(4) There were [Pro] blokes throwing beer cans [Ca] in the square [Loc].

Such data suggest strongly that the analysis of *There were blokes throwing beer cans* should be as in (3b), with a covert Location:

(3b) There were [Pro] blokes throwing beer cans [Ca] (Loc).

Similarly, the analysis of *There were two seeded players beaten in the first round* will be as in (4a) - where the Location is left covert:

(4) There were [Pro] two seeded players beaten in the first round [Ca] (Loc).

In this analysis, then, the verb *were* is a Main Verb in each case, and not an Auxiliary.

The most problematical cases for this type of analysis are the type illustrated here:

(5a) There have been [Pro] a lot of trees cut down [Ca] round here [Loc].

To be consistent, we should analyse this as if it were very similar to:

(5b) There are [Pro] a lot of trees that have been cut down [Ca] round here [Loc],

with *that have been cut down* as a qualifier.  
But it is also possible to relate it to (5c):

(5c) A lot of trees [Af] have [X] been [X] cut [Pro] down [Prex] round here [A/Pl]

It seems as if the central concept in this structure is locational, but that at some time in the past the possibility of extending the construction to ALL cases of the verb *be* has been introduced, perhaps originally, as so often, verbal play. Yet the essential concept of 'existence at a location' has reasserted itself, and the variants have, by and large, been forced to accommodate themselves to the essential function of this construction - namely, to introduce a new entity to the discourse, and to present it as an Enhanced Theme.

Problem of associated form *to be had*

There's lots of sunny weather to be had (in Wales) this morning.  
There's lots of sunny weather to be had (in Wales) this morning.  
There's lots of sunny weather (that's) to be had this morning.  
There's lots of sunny weather (that's) to be had (by those in Wales) this morning.

Exercise:

Song sung by Peggy Lee: Is that all there is?  
ngp: all [h] (that) there is [q]  
cl at q: (that [C/Ca]) there [S] is [O/M] (in/to my life ?[C/Loc])

#### **4 Construction 4: *seem* etc. as a cognition Process with an event as Phenomenon**

***It + seem / look etc (to X) + that / as if-clause***

Examples:

It seems / appears that she loves you.  
It seems / appears to me that she loves you.  
It has always seemed to me that she loves you.  
It looks (to me) as if that bird we saw was a woodpecker.  
It sounds (to me) as if you want to go home.  
It strikes me that she loves you.

There are a few types of Process where the application of the end weight principle is obligatory. We shall deal with one here, and another with a similar structure in Section 4b. Thus we cannot say *\*That she loves you seems to me* (this being a fairly direct representation of the logical form which we shall assume here) - but we can say *It seems to me that she loves you*.

However, the Participant Role (PR) expressed into *me* is often covert, yielding *It seems that she loves you*, and this may be the reason why the discussion of this problematical structure in some other grammars ignores the role of the Cognizant. Yet it is clearly always possible for it to be there. In a functional approach we naturally want to show the function served by *to me* when *to me* is there, and we want to show it as a **covert** role when it is not. We therefore need an approach which allows for this PR.

Our analysis of such clauses shows how the apparently idiosyncratic pattern associated with *seem* and the few similar verbs does in fact conform to (1) a central and frequent configuration of PRs (though with the Process first, and a role that is typically present reduced to optional status). If we apply the re-expression tests for PRs set out in Chapter 21, the analysis of *It seems/ appears to me that she loves you* is as in (1):

(1) It seems / appears [Pro] to me [Cog] that she loves you [Ph].

Notice the similarity, in PR terms, to *I think that She loves you*, where the analysis is as in (2):

(2) I [Cog] think [Pro] that she loves you [Ph].

A similar analysis to that in (1) fits (3) and (4):

(3) It looks / sounds [Pro] to me [Cog] as if she loves you [Ph].

(4) It strikes [Pro] me [Cog] that she loves you [Ph].

### **Another use of *seem***

It may be useful to remind you that some of the same verbs appear with the attributive type of relational process. Thus *Ivy seems / appears / looks / sounds very clever* would be analyzed as in (5):

(5) Ivy [Ca] seems [Pro] very clever [At]

But in *Ivy seems (to me) to be very clever*, the analysis is:

Ivy [S] seems [X] (to me [A]) to [I] be [M] very clever [C].

cp Section 5.4 of Chapter 14.

### **4b Construction 4b: *happen* etc as a material process with an**

## event as Carrier

*It + happen /turn out, etc + that-clause*

Examples:

It happens that she loves you.  
It turned out that she loves you.

XXX Add more from notes

## 5 Construction 5: Subject to Subject raising: Process as validity

**XXX NB this and the next proposed functional explanation do not cover all of the types of ‘raising’ construction. Unfortunately they are not necessarily ‘validity’: Consider this case of ‘Subject to Complement raising’:**

e.g. She started him singing in public last year.

**And consider also this case of ‘Subject to Subject raising’:**

He was stopped by the authorities from singing in public

As a general explanation, both may be explained by the creeping influence of the ‘tell’ type of construction, (in which there are three PRs, not two, as here):

She [S] told [M] him [C] to sing in public [C] and

He [S] was [O/X] told [M] <by the authorities [C]> not to sing in public [C]  
<by the authorities [C]>

My solution to the problem is to deal with this type of ‘inter-layer’ adjustment in the logical form,

XXX Add numbers to examples?

**XXX Consider treating the types exemplified by Nos 1-3 below as the ‘report’ type of validity assessment, i.e. as fuller versions of *Ivy is thought / said to be very clever*, and the types exemplified in 4-5 as ‘control’.** Thus a clause would fill the Validity Auxiliary Extension (VXex) and the Control Auxiliary Extension (CXex) respectively. The associated realization rules would need to constrain the choices appropriately on re-entry.

**Advantages of ths approach:** it would generate both the ‘basic’ type and the present types in the same way, stating the constraints on which Process types are

available just once. The apparent (small) cost would be that every Xex of these types would be filled by a clause, even when only the exponent of the Main Verb is needed. But this in fact has the advantage that the lexical verb can be generated in exactly the same way in both cases - i.e. in precisely the same way that all lexical verbs are generated, as elements of clauses.

## Examples

- 1 Ivy is thought / believed by most people to be very clever.
- 2 Ivy is said / reported by most people to be very clever.
- 3 Fred was seen / found (by Ivy) reading a strip cartoon.

5 Fred was caused / forced (by JD / circumstances) to leave London. (like 'telling?')

## Prelude

**XXX I should probably move all the rest of this section, down to the next construction, to Ch 13 (???), and simply summarize it here and refer to there for a full account.**

Consider the first three\* of the five examples given above. You may notice that they do not have brackets in them, while the last two do.

\* NB I've changed the order.

The reason is that when these occur without the *by*-group they are analysed as shown in examples (1a), (2a) and (3a) below (as explained in Chapter 13). This is a much simpler way of analysing them than that which would be used if these examples were analysed as cases of the present construction, and the position adopted here is that in SIMPLE cases of *thought*, *said*, *believed*, etc, what was earlier in the history of English a lexical verb is now becoming also able to be used as an item that functions as an Auxiliary Extension. So in (1a)

- (1a) Ivy [S/Ca] is [O/X] thought [X<sup>ex</sup>] to [I] be [M] very clever [C/At].  
(1b) Ivy [S/Ca] is [O/X] likely [X<sup>ex</sup>] to [I] be [M] very clever [C/At].  
(2a) Ivy [S/Ca] is [O/X] said [X<sup>ex</sup>] to [I] be [M] very clever [C/At].  
(2b) Ivy [S/Ca] is [O/M] reputedly [A<sup>v</sup>] very clever [C/At].

Thus in (1a) *thought* is treated in the same way as *supposed* is treated by some grammarians, as argued in Chapter 13.

As we saw in Chapter 13, the functional approach to syntax suggests the value of setting up the concept of an Auxiliary Extension (X<sup>ex</sup>) to handle the realizations of various types of meaning such as *sure*, *bound*, *anxious*, *supposed*, *inclined* and

*obliged* and in *He is sure/bound/anxious/supposed/inclined/obliged to be there*. We saw then that the meanings of these words is often quite different when they occur at this place in structure from what their meanings would be if they were, say, the apex of a quality group at the Complement of a clause, as for example with *anxious* in *She was very anxious*. And it seems that the language is allowing more and more verbs to function as an X<sup>ex</sup>.

In the framework for syntax analysis used in this handbook we are simply following the direction indicated by the changes in the language itself in recognizing that, in the three examples above, words that were originally full lexical verbs are being increasingly used as Auxiliary Extensions - rather as has already happened with *bound*, *supposed*, *inclined* and *obliged* (among others).

Recognizing that certain verbs that report wordings, thoughts and feelings can also be insightfully analysed in this manner has the helpful effect of making the syntax analysis easier. This is because they avoid the complexity of the raising construction that we are about to consider. But if, on the other hand, a Participant IS introduced, as in the examples at the head of this section, the X<sup>ex</sup> analysis is no longer possible, and the 'raising' construction that we must now turn to becomes the only possibility. Perhaps the current changes that appear to be happening in this area of the English language support the view that there is an inherent tendency in the language to re-assert the simpler structures of syntax, i.e. those that conform to the principles outlined in Chapter 22.

XXX Cut/abandon the following (earlier0 introduction...

### **The problems of 'raising' constructions**

The final three (two?) special constructions to be considered here involve the decision to thematize a role - but in a different way from that in Constructions 1 and 2. They do NOT serve a discourse function, and they do NOT give to the thematized role the special status of being an Enhanced Theme. We shall come to the question of WHY these constructions are used when we have seen HOW they work. But first we have to deal with the question of whether to analyse one type of construction that is widely assumed to be a 'raising' construction really should be analyzed in this way.


I will argue here that, on balance, it should not, and that it is part of an ongoing development in the English language. But the problem for which the 'raising' metaphor was introduced in the first place remains for two other, less frequent cases, so that I do not think that we can get rid of 'raising' completely. The problem in analysing these two remaining constructions is that a role which clearly has a function in the TOPMOST clause is also clearly a role that is expected by the Process of the EMBEDDED clause.

Consider the problem of analysing *Ivy* in *Ivy is thought by most people to be clever*. *What is the status of Ivy?* This question presents a serious problem to the analyst, because the Process that expects the PR which *Ivy* fills (a Carrier) is in a

clause (expressing the event of 'someone being clever'), and this clause is EMBEDDED as the Phenomenon expected by the Process of 'thinking'. And yet there is no doubt that *Ivy* is also the Subject of the TOPMOST clause, because the polarity seeking equivalent would be: *Is Ivy thought by most people to be clever?* One slightly messy analysis is therefore as in (1):

If we take 'thinking' to be the process in the matrix clause, the analysis will be something like the following, and it will consequently raise a number of problems.

XXXProbably don't use this next figure, as it is NOT the favoured analysis



Here *Ivy ...to be clever* is interpreted as the Phenomenon in the Process of 'thinking', and the Cognizant in that Process is *most people*. The asterisk (\*) on the clause embedded at the Phenomenon signals that a PR has been 'raised' from this construction to perform the role of Subject in the topmost clause.

It is an interesting fact about such constructions that the raised element must have been a Subject in the embedded clause. This suggests the possibility of a totally different approach, in which the verb *be* is taken to be the Main Verb of the highest clause in each of (2) to (5).

XXX Check by later discussion...

- (2) Ivy must be the cleverest person in the room.
- (3) Ivy is bound to be the cleverest person in the room.
- (4) Ivy is believed to be the cleverest person in the room.
- (5) Ivy is believed by most of us to be the cleverest person in the room.

Is (5) like (4) or like *Who do most of us believe to be the cleverest person in the room.* i.e. QQQ Construction XX

XXX Analyses:

In grammars influenced by the transformational tradition this is described as a 'raising' construction, and it is regarded there as a transformation of one syntax tree into another. In a SFG approach we shall of course not think in terms of a transformation - but the term 'raising' can be used appropriately, in that the role is seen as being 'raised' from an **embedded** structure in the **logical form** to the **matrix** structure in the **syntax**. And, because the raised role in the embedded event would have been the Subject of the embedded clause if it had not been raised, we can stretch a point and use the old transformationalist term 'Subject to Subject raising'.

The key question is: What is the function of this construction? There are three important facts about it which, taken together, suggest what the functional structure is. First, the Main Verb in the matrix clause is always one of a set of mental processes, and it is most frequently a process of cognition. As the examples above illustrate, they may be two role **cognition** processes (*know, think, believe, consider* etc, and also *expect, intend* etc., or three role cognition processes such as *say, report* and *tip*, or **perception** processes (*see* and *hear*, but also *find* and *catch*, used in a 'perception' sense'. In particularly constrained syntactic contexts they may also be 'emotion' processes, as in *Ivy is wanted ((to be)) upstairs*. They may also be verbs typically thought of as **influential** Processes such as *cause, force, allow, permit*, etc, which at first seem to fit the motivation to be suggested below less well. But when the 'influencer' in such Processes (i.e. the Agent) is a person (e.g. *Ivy*) rather than a non-person (e.g. 'circumstances') it seems that we regard these Processes as 'communication' processes - i.e. as three-role cognition processes. Second, it is always the Subject - i.e. the unmarked theme - of the embedded clause that is raised to be the Subject - and so the unmarked theme - of the matrix clause. Third, the matrix clause is always passive.

The reason for using this construction will be come clear if we consider the following:

- (2) Ivy may / must be very clever.
- (3) Ivy is possibly / definitely [A/Val] very clever.
- (4) Ivy is, I think / I'm sure, [RepA] very clever.
  
- (5a) I think / believe (that) [RepA] Ivy is very clever (isn't she?)
- (5b) I think / believe that Ivy is very clever.
- (5c) ??I think / believe [RepA] (that) Ivy is very clever (((don't I?)))
  
- (6a) Everyone thinks / knows (that) Ivy is very clever.
- (6b) Ivy is thought / known ((by everyone)) to be very clever.
- (6c) Everyone says / reports (that) Ivy is very clever.
- (6d) Ivy is said / reported ((by everyone)) to be very clever.

- (7a) Someone has seen / heard / caught Fred eating potato crisps {at 3 a.m.}  
 (7b) Fred has been seen / heard / caught <(by someone)> eating potato crisps <(by someone)> {at 3 a.m.}.
- (8a) JD made Ivy eat the caviar / allowed Ivy to eat the caviar.  
 (8b) Ivy was made / allowed <((by JD))> to eat the caviar <((by JD))>.
- (9a) Vertigo forced Ike to give up.  
 (9b) Ike was forced <((by vertigo))> to give up <((by vertigo))>.


Examples (2), (3) and (4) above are all straightforward expressions of 'modality', i.e. they all express P's assessment of the validity of the event. There is a modal verb expressing 'validity' at the Operator in (2) and there are Validity and Report (XXX) Adjuncts in (3) and (4).

But Example (5a) is problematical. If the tag 'agrees' with *Ivy* rather than with *I*, as it does in (5a) the items *I* and *think* are clearly not the Subject and Main Verb. The words *I think/believe* are therefore functioning as an initial Report Adjunct, rather as they are a Report Adjunct in (4). Note that the inclusion of *that* in (5a) makes it less natural to add the Tag Adjunct *isn't she*, but not impossible. So unfortunately the presence of the item *that* does not resolve the question of the status of *I think/believe*. In (5c) the tag *don't I* is extremely unlikely, but it is just possible.

Although there is the difference that we have just brought out between (5a) and the others, it is the same verb *think* that is used in all three. Example (5) therefore brings us very close to the constructions with which we are concerned here, as in (6). To say *Ivy is thought to be very clever* is quite close to saying *Ivy may be very clever*. In other words, Construction 8 is used to express a range of concepts that are quite similar to the judgements of validity expressed by Modal Operators and Adjuncts. The Main verb functions, in a sense, rather like a Modal Operator. This explains why the construction only allows the Subject of the embedded clause to be raised to the Subject of the matrix clause, and also why the 'sayer' or 'believer' is typically a **covert** role, and so unrealised. What typically matters is the degree of validity, and the question of whose authority that validity rests on is of secondary importance.

Even more importantly, this explanation shows why the construction occurs most frequently with processes of **cognition**. The main dimension of variation in the cognition processes is precisely in the degree of the confidence that the Cognizant has in the validity of the event. And on those occasions when this construction does occur with other types of process, such as the cases involving perception processes (7) and influential processes (8), there is always the sense that the event is a REPORTED event. In (7), for example, P only knows that Fred has been seen / heard / caught eating potato crisps, because someone has REPORTED this to P. And the processes of 'forcing' or 'allowing someone to do something' are typically mediated by some communicative process, and so very close indeed to central three-role cognition processes such as 'telling', 'persuading' and 'inviting someone to do something'. Thus these processes should in cases like (8b) be analysed as three-role cognition processes rather than as influential processes. (In

cases like (8a) there is ambiguity of the type that typically occurs in a natural languages here and there.) Interestingly, the Affected-Cognizant in such processes is obligatorily covert, and even the source of the authority, the Agent, is typically unrealized - as the double brackets in (6b) indicate.



Finally, there are a few case such as those in (9) where the 'report' interpretation should logically not apply. One may either interpret them as metaphor - in which case the same analysis would be made as in (8), or we may allow them to be a special case of the construction which has perhaps been made possible by the semantic and structural parallels where the Agent-influencer is a communicating person. We favour the latter approach.

**XXX But is there is a problem for this approach?** Consider:

(a) Last week [???] Ivy [S] was [O/DirX] ordered by JD [DirXex] to [I] leave [M] in June [TPA].

The problem is that the initial Adjunct seems to apply to the 'ordering' event, **not the 'leaving' event**, and if we treat the 'ordering' event as embedded in the Xex, we can't show this. Note that in the following there is no problem, since the TPA can be treated in a natural manner as part of the embedded clause.

(b) Ivy [S] was [O/DirX] ordered last week by JD [DirXex] to [I] leave [M] in June [TPA].

This suggests that *was ordered by JD* is part of the same clause - and presumably

the matrix clause - as *last week*.

**A possible way out of the dilemma.** Note the quite strong possibility of a comma after the initial TPA *Last week*. This suggests that it may be functioning as a Scene-setting Time Position Adjunct, so setting the scene for the following propositions. This would enable us to continue with the above analyses, and so to keep to the minimum the number of cases of 'raising'-type constructions - in fact to just one (??)

## 7 Construction 7: Sought (or referring out) role in report to new content seeker theme raising

Examples with 'reporting' Processes

- 1a Who did you say you saw yesterday? [C in the embedded clause]
- 1b (Is this) who you said you saw yesterday?
- 1c (Is this the man) who you said you saw yesterday?
- 2a Who do you think ate it? [S in the embedded clause]
- 2b (Is this) who you think ate it?
- 2c (Is this the man) who you think ate it?
- 3a What make of car would you prefer to drive? [part of C in the embedded clause]
- 3b (Is this the make of car) that would you prefer to drive?
- 4a When do you want me to go there? [A in the embedded clause]
- 4b (Is tomorrow) when you want me to go there?
- 4c (Is tomorrow the day) when you want me to go there?
- 5a What do you think we ought to do next? [Process + in the embedded clause]
- 5b Is that what you think we ought to do next?

Examples with 'controlling' Processes

- 6a Who did you force / allow to go there? [C in the embedded clause]
- 6b (Is this) who you forced / allowed to go there?
- 6b (Is this the man) who you forced / allowed to go there?


Examples of multiple 'reporting' Processes

- 7a Who did you say you heard her say she saw?
- 7b (Is this) who you said you heard her say she saw?
- 7b (Is this the man) who you said you heard her say she saw?

First, the raised role is always one that is SOUGHT, i.e. it is the 'new content seeker theme' (i.e. a role realized by a *wh*-element that appears at the front of the topmost clause). Second, the raised role can be **any element of the embedded clause**. The examples illustrate this clearly: in the first it is a Complement that is raised; in the second it is the Subject; in the the third the sought element is

embedded in the typical determiner of the Complement; in the fourth it is an Adjunct; and in the fifth it is the Main Verb Extension (Mex). Finally, you will notice that the types of process are similar to those in Construction 8, except that emotion processes occur frequently here. In both constructions there is a lot of variation that depends on the particular verb used. A final difference is that this construction it is OBLIGATORY if there is a sought element in the embedded event. The need to make such a role the theme of the matrix clause is paramount - but only with these types of process.

In this type of raising construction, then, ANY role that is 'sought' - i.e. any *wh*-element - is raised from its place in an embedded event in the logical form to function as the 'new content seeker theme' of the matrix clause. The analysis of the matrix clause is therefore as follows:



And within the clause *When ... me to go there* the analysis is simply:

When (Time Position) ....me [Ag-Ca] to go there [Tar]

The principle at work in these constructions is, like Principle 3, a type of thematization, and it is Principle 4.

**Principle 4:** Under given conditions, it possible to raise to the status of the Subject or 'sought' role in the highest clause the **Subject** or **sought role** in a clause embedded in the Phenomenon of a clause in which the Main Verb reports a feeling, a thought or a saying. A consequence of this 'raising' is that the Process in the matrix clause comes to have some of the meaning that is most typically expressed through a modal verb that expresses the Performer's confidence in the **validity** of the clause. Both the Subject and the sought role are types of 'theme' (in a broad interetation of the term). Thus this can be

termed the **theme raised from report** principle (where 'reports' may be of feelings as well as beliefs and wordings).

Finally, notice that the fourth example at the head of this section is one of the 'problem' sentences from the short text with which we began Chapter 2.1.

## 8 Construction 8: Marked PR theme raising

Examples:

His last book I thought was very exciting.

His last book I thought to be very exciting.

## 9 Construction 9: Discontinuous groups

Examples:

The time has come when you must leave.

Ike is a more important person than me.

There are certain constructions that show the application of the **end weight** and **get the pivotal element in soon** principle, but without involving **enhanced theme** and so an empty Subject. One is *The time has come when you must leave*. Here the clause *when you must leave* is a qualifier in the **discontinuous nominal group** *the time ... when you must leave*. (The whole nominal group fills the Carrier in a situation with the configuration of Ca + Pro.)

The same principle applies in a nominal group such as *a more important person than me*. Here, the words *than me* are a finisher in the **discontinuous quantity quality group** *more (t) important (a) ... than me (f)*. But here the principle is not **get the main verb in soon**, but **get the head in soon**. The principle is essentially the same, because the head of a nominal group is the key to interpreting it in the same way that the Main Verb of a clause is.

## 10 Combinations of special constructions

Naturally, the problems of analysis are even harder when two or more special constructions are combined. Let us take a particularly hard example to end with.

### Problem case 1

Probably a wrong analysis. See Ch 14 Section 5.4, and PRs chapter for *seem*. XXX cp

Consider the logical form of an *it seems* construction (Construction 4), e.g. the logical form for the ungrammatical *\*That Ivy is clever seems to me*. If we first

apply the three principles described in Construction 1 ('end weight', 'enhanced theme' and 'get the main verb in soon') to the logical form, we get a form equivalent to \**seems to me that Ivy is clever*. This is the first stage in working toward **Construction 4**, i.e. it happens in the logical form (and not within realization rules of the lexicogrammar). And if we then raise 'Ivy' from the embedded event *that Ivy is clever*, i.e. as for **Construction 8** ('raising'), then we get the logical form underlying *Ivy seems (to me) to be clever*. This provides the input to the system networks, giving the output whose PR analysis is:

Ivy... [Ph: Pt 1] seems [Pro] to me [Cog] ...to be clever [Ph: Pt 2].

Within the embedded clause *Ivy ... to be clever* the analysis is simply, as before:

Ivy [Ca] ... to be [Pro] clever [At].

There is an irony here. The explanation of *Ivy seems to be clever* is complex, while that of *Ivy seems clever* is simple. The analysis of *Ivy seems clever* is simply:

Ivy [Ca] seems clever [At].


Yet there is no avoiding the complexity of *Ivy seems to be clever*, if we are to provide in a principled way for *Ivy seems to me to be clever* and, less closely, *It seems that Ivy is clever*. This is simply one of several places in syntax where two sentences which appear at first sight to be closely related syntactically turn out not to be.

## **Problem case 2**

To please Ivy is easy

Construction 1 It is easy to please Ivy

Construction 6a: Embedded Role to Subject raising (any? see Q85:18.36 fn)



## 10 Summary of difficulties with the 'special constructions'

This concludes the survey of 'special constructions'. We have introduced a number of syntactic complexities in this section, including one case where two causes of difficulty are combined. Many of the hardest problems in analysis occur when two (or more) of these special constructions are combined with each other, or with one of the other possible sources of difficulty mentioned in Section 4.1.2.3 of Part 4.

However, so long as you apply carefully the re-expression tests given in Section 4 above, it should always be possible to work out a principled analysis of such cases.

## 11 Supplement to the Guidelines in Chapter 20

Add this section

### References

Fawcett, R.P., 1987a. 'The semantics of clause and verb for relational processes in English'. In Halliday, M.A.K., and Fawcett, R.P. (eds.) 1987a. *New Developments in Systemic Linguistics, Vol 1: Theory and Description*. London: Frances Pinter, pp. 130-83.

Halliday, M.A.K., 1970b. 'Language structure and language function'. In Lyons,

J. (ed.) 1970, *New Horizons in Linguistics*, Harmondsworth: Penguin, pp. 140-65.

Halliday, M.A.K., 1985. *An Introduction to Functional Grammar*. London: Arnold.

Quirk, R., Greenbaum, S., Leech, G., and Svartvik, J., 1985. *A Comprehensive Grammar of the English Language*. London: Longman.

#### RPF 25-31.8.93

a. Occasionally the Process is *seems, appears*, etc, as we shall see below.

b. If your first reaction to the proposal that we should treat the clause *that he wants a pizza* as a Carrier is that this is a somewhat unusual type of Carrier, this is understandable, because Carriers are usually filled by simple nominal groups. And, as we saw in Chapter 23, a Carrier of this type should not be expected to pass the Carrier test as it stands. Chapter 22 showed that a *that*-clause must first be changed into the *-ing* form, i.e. *Ike wanting a pizza*. Then we can re-express the whole clause as *The thing about Ike wanting a pizza is that it is obvious* - which is still somewhat odd, but just about possible. (Clearly, we must also analyse the internal structure of the **embedded** clause *that Ike wants a pizza* in PR terms, but this is straightforward.)

c. Notice that it is only in the framework of a model of language that gives a significant place to the affective strand of meaning that an adequate explanation of this phenomenon can be given.

d. Very occasionally we find an example where it is hard to decide whether it is a case of this construction or Construction 2. Sometimes a construction with a 'usuality' meaning appears more like an evaluative enhanced theme construction rather than experiential enhanced theme construction, e.g. as in *It isn't often that Ike wants a pizza*. An example such as *It is every Friday that they have fish and chips* is a clear case of Construction 2, because there is a referential entity 'every Friday'. But what about an example such as *It isn't often that Ike wants a pizza?* Is this the same construction as *It's rare that Ike wants a pizza?* The pragmatic implications of *It isn't often that ...* and *It's rare that ...* are very similar, but I suggest that this is a case of the 'near-equivalence' of two meanings that are derived from **DIFFERENT** sets of options in the lexicogrammar. Note that one is 'positive' and one 'negative' - and that **POLARITY** is a separate dimension of variation. We therefore treat an example such as *It isn't often that Ike wants a pizza* in the same way as *It's often that Ike wants a pizza*, and so as a case of Construction 2. But *It's rare that Ike wants a pizza* is treated as being like *It's unusual that Ike wants a pizza*, and so is an example of Construction 1.

e. For this type of meaning I have adopted Francis' term 'rationality'; there seems to be no equivalent in Lemke's taxonomy.

f. Lemke (1998:40) refers to my proposal of this category (in an unpublished version of Fawcett forthcoming), but lumps this type of meaning (which I formerly called 'affective effect') in with my 'affective' category, and so includes them in his 'desirability' (Lemke 1998:36-40). The danger that my previous label for this type of meaning, together with the examples of 'slippage', may lead readers into treating the two as belonging to the same class is what has prompted me to adopt the name of 'emotional response' (which is also used in Biber et al (1999:673), though only as a minor sub-category).

g. Halliday takes a rather unsatisfactory approach to this construction in *IFG*. He does not identify it as a major construction of English, including a couple of examples in his discussion of 'predicated Theme' at the bottom of page 60. He rightly points out that 'these are not predicated Themes' - but he does not then go on to say what they are. On page 121 he cites a number of examples of adjectives and nominal groups that may enter into this construction, as a special sub-type of 'intensive attributive' processes. This sounds at first as if it implies an analysis that might be similar to that given here, but it is not. In his example *Isn't it a pity that photograph got spoilt?* (which in its uneliptical form would be *Isn't it a pity that that photograph got spoilt?*) he claims that the Carrier is not just *that(that) photograph got spoilt*, but *it ... that(that) photograph got spoilt*, i.e. 'it plus postposed theme' (where he finds himself using an explicitly transformational approach to the construction (most untypically). As I have argued elsewhere, the

terms we use matter because they invoke 'the metaphors we live by' (Lakoff and Johnson (1980) as we do our linguistics.

h. It is done in the GENESYS computer implementation of SFG at Cardiff. It may also be useful to point out that few, if any, researchers in the psycholinguistics of language production believe that the transformation of one syntactic structure into another is part of the way that people actually produce sentences in real life. Indeed, very few transformational grammarians have ever claimed that it is; transformations are supposedly a formal convenience for summarising economically the structural possibilities of the language.

i. As with Construction 1, the embedded clause *what Ike wants* must be changed to an *-ing* form (and, of course, *what* to *something*) before applying the test to show that it is a Carrier. Thus we can just about say - odd though it sounds - *The thing about Ike wanting something is that it is a pizza.*

j. Indeed, there is a clear reluctance to give non-particularized Attributes the status of enhanced theme - perhaps because of the dangers of ambiguity. How would you expect a sentence beginning *It's really nice that ..... to end?* Probably NOT with .... *that Ivy is.*

k. Quirk et al (1985: 1384) support this analysis in the sense that they recognize, through their statement that 'the cleft sentence indicates divided focus', that there is a second Tonic in the embedded clause in constructions of this type. But they do not provide the explanation of WHY this occurs that is offered here. However, it is their example which reminds us that the Contrastive Tonic can occur anywhere, including what is typically the presupposed information, if it contains an element that is to be corrected. It thus has the ability to override the generalizations set up so far. To borrow the example of Quirk et al (but using the intonation marking introduced here):

- (6) A: You should criticise his callousness (NT/1).  
B: No, it is his **callousness** (CN/12) that I shall ignore (CN1+).

Here, in B's utterance, the Enhanced Theme is *his callousness*, and, as usual so far, it is also Contrastively New. But a second element is also marked as Contrastively New, and this overrides the typical pattern of having a simple Tonic for the second information unit. However, we shall not need to consider such cases further here.

l. In the first of these three examples (which is of a type that typically occurs in written texts), it would in fact be reasonable to place a tonic on the *nine of eighteen seventy-nine*, because of its considerable semantic content. But this would not be the contrastive tonic with which we would expect (2b) to be read. And the tonic in the second example could come on *Independence*, if it were felt that *were sown* was recoverable.

m. In this respect it is more like Construction 1 that the first type of enhanced theme considered here - but it is still clearly a non-experiential enhanced theme construction.

n. The basis of the approach taken here is therefore similar to that of many influential scholars. Thus Quirk et al 1985, especially in their discussion of the so-called 'bare existential sentences' (p. 1402f.), follow Lyons 1968 in regarding such clauses as having a covert Location (see also Fawcett 1987). But Quirk et al. are wrong, in my view, in suggesting that the function of this construction is to 'enable the originator to indicate the "new" status of a whole clause (p. 1402). I am suggesting here that its basic discourse function is to introduce a major new entity to the discourse - i.e. a single entity rather than a whole event, as proposed by Quirk et al. (There is sometimes an exploitation of this for special effects, as so often with the main conventions of language, as described in the main text.) There is support for this view of the construction's function in, for example, Sinclair et al 1987:415f., whose section on *there*-constructions is headed 'Introducing something new: *there* as subject'.

The main problems for the approach adopted here are exemplified by the section of Quirk et al 1985 which sets out to show 'correspondences with basic clause patterns' (pp. 1403-4). This foregrounds the possibility of transforming clauses with ANY form of the verb *be* - whether M or X - into a *there*-clause. But Quirk et al. go a long way towards the view taken here in (1) treating all supposedly 'bare existential constructions as clauses with a covert Location, and (2) in their approach (p. 1406f.) to the type of 'existential clauses with relative and infinitive clauses, ... which resembles the cleft construction'.

The proposals presented here make the assumption that ALL of the different types of *there*-construction are locational - as is suggested by the historical trace of the Location in the 'empty Subject' *there* - and that all are cases of enhanced theme - as is suggested by the 'thematic build-up' of *there* + *be*. Thus I would analyse all the examples given by Quirk et al. on p. 1404 as locational clauses, with all the cases cited except the second having (1) a covert Location and (2) a group or clause embedded at q in the ngp that fills the Carrier. Thus *There were plenty of people getting promotion* would be analysed here as *There* (S<sup>th</sup>) *were* (O/M) *plenty of people (who were) getting promotion* (C/Ca) [*in the firm* (C/Loc)] - where *(who were) getting promotion* is a relative clause at q in the ngp *plenty of people getting promotion*. What Quirk et al. and Sinclair et al. do NOT show, unfortunately, is how they would analyse the examples they discuss - and it isn't always inferable from their descriptions.

What is presented here is a unitary explanation of the phenomena that occur in the various types of *there*- construction, and a unitary syntactic analysis for them all. This approach suggests that the most natural-sounding cases are those where there is a simple locational Process, with either an overt or a covert Location, and that cases such as *There have been several trees cut down here recently* fall outside the most typical pattern - while still being, of course, acceptable. (They may have originated as a playful 'back-formation', overgeneralising from the type of *there*-construction in which the form of *be* is a Main Verb to ALL forms of *be* - including those where it is an Auxiliary Verb.)

o. There is another sense of *follow* in which it is an 'event-relating' Process, as in *Seven grim years of austerity followed the war* and *The war was followed by seven grim years of austeriy*. So in a text such as *The symphony will follow the sonata* the two pieces of music are being interpreted as **events** rather than **objects**, and so as Participants in an 'event-relating' Process (for which see Chapter 2 of the *Functional Semantics Handbook*).