

PART C

**SPECIAL SYNTACTIC CONSTRUCTIONS -
AND THE FOUR PRINCIPLES THAT GUIDE
THEM**

Four principles that lead to 'special constructions'

XXX The key points of the discussion (expand)

- 0 Various scholars have suggested sets of principles that guide the construction of syntactic structures. (Refer in a footnote to, e.g., Leech and Hawkins.) Here I will identify (a) the one basic principle that underlies all syntax - which is so obvious that it is seldom mentioned - and (b) four principles which, taken together, explain why speakers of human languages nonetheless breach that basic principle, and which explain why we have introduced to the language the 'special constructions' that are described in the next chapter.
- 1 In English (and in other languages) there are a number of what we will call **special constructions**. These run counter to the canonical structures of English, but they are nonetheless part of the 'core' grammar (and so are more central to the grammar than those constructions that we have identified as part of the 'ancillary' grammar).
 - 2 Sometimes they involve the introduction of a superordinate clause in which the simple clause that corresponds to the original input is embedded in one of several ways (two types of 'enhanced theme construction'). Sometimes they involve the occurrence in a higher unit (typically but not necessarily the topmost clause) of an element that belongs, in terms of the experiential analysis, as an element of an embedded unit, And this in turn typically involves discontinuity, i.e. the presentation of part of a syntactic unit either earlier or later in the clause than the main part of the unit.
 - 3 Where the element (or in a few cases elements, in the plural) is/are placed earlier in the construction than the norm, it is one of several types of thematization.
 - 4 Where the element is placed later in the construction than the norm, it is there to be marked as potentially 'new' information.
 - 5 In principle, two broad types of analysis of many of the phenomena for which the thematization principle is invoked need to be considered:
 - (a) 'discontinuous componentence', i.e. the occurrence of two parts of a unit, separated by intervening elements, such that the first part (which is typically a single element) occurs at a place in the structure of a unit that is at a higher layer of the tree diagram of the text-sentence (this sometimes being called 'long distance dependency' in formal grammars);^a
 - (b) treating what at first may appear to be the Main Verbs of such constructions as types of either 'validity' (including 'reports of validity' or 'power & volition' - specifically, as Auxiliary Extensions expressing types of 'control' and 'disposition', which are required in any case in a full

a. Another term used to describe such constructions, which misleadingly implies that they are the result of a syntactic transformation, is 'raising constructions'.

grammar, and which are being 'colonized', as it were, in Modern English for the expression of these types of meaning - two broad types of meaning, incidentally, that are expressed in modal verbs and a few Auxiliaries.

Here I will:

- (a) list the range of phenomena to which 'discontinuous competence' is a possible analysis;
- (b) identify those for which this analysis is unquestionably the best solution (*Who were you seen by?*, etc)
- (c) identify and describe the possible solutions in both types of analysis;
- (d) identify the forms that are 'experientially' related to each;
- (e) discuss the pros and cons of each (recognizing that we cannot maintain a close syntactic relationship between all of the 'special constructions' and the structurally simpler experiential equivalents);
- (f) advise which of the analyses I recommend as most insightful;
- (g) outline the way in which the 'equivalences' and 'near equivalences' in the representations of the logical forms of these constructions are able to capture the similarities that cannot be captured within the lexicon grammar.

XXX Include the 'Minimize discontinuity' principle mentioned at the end of Section 2; should it be made Principle 1?

1 Functional criteria in analyzing the special constructions

Throughout this book I have emphasized the value of adopting an approach to understanding language in which the **functional** is given a more powerful role than the **formal**. This has led at times to analyses that are significantly different from those that are suggested when the criteria are predominantly formal. This is particularly true of the **special constructions** that are covered in this part of the handbook.

These 'special constructions' are widely recognized as raising problems for the syntax analyst. Most modern books on English grammar discuss at least some of them in general terms, and most functionally-oriented works, such as Leech's *Principles of Pragmatics* (1983) and the associated grammars such as Quirk *et al* 1985, often provide explanations that have something in common with what is proposed here. One problem with most of these descriptions is that they do not provide the diagrams that would show what the syntactic analysis of the construction actually is.

This *Handbook* gives you (a) a set of the five key principles that explain WHY the language has developed these 'special constructions', and (b) a full set of diagrams that show in detail HOW to analyze the 'special constructions' to which the application of the principles leads.¹

The key to understanding these special constructions is to understand the principles that make them EFFECTIVE AIDS TO COMMUNICATION. And, as we shall see, many of these constructions are the result of applying not just one principle, but a combination of two or even three.

Sometimes the syntax is organised into a construction whose purpose seems to be to present the elements of the message in a way that makes it easier for the Addressee to process the incoming clause. The construction aids understanding on a small scale, i.e. WITHIN THE CLAUSE OR GROUP itself. The second and fifth of the five principles to be recognized below are of this type. But other constructions are as they are in order to serve a particular function IN THE DISCOURSE - such as that of re-introducing a referent that has been referred to already, but which the Performer is presenting to the Addressee as unexpected at this point. (From now on in this chapter - as in others - we shall refer to the Performer as P and the Addressee as A.)

There is another sense in which the explanations of these 'special constructions' that will be given here are 'functional'. In many of the constructions a crucial part of the explanation will depend on the fact that we shall ask, for every clause, about the 'functions' served by the units that it contains - i.e. we shall ask what the **Participant Roles** (PRs) of the clause are. Many of these constructions involve the verb *be*, and we shall find that it helps us to solve many of the problems associated with these constructions when we recognize that the verb *be* is a Process in an example such as *It was a badger that we saw*, just as it is in *Ivy is clever*. Surprisingly, this approach has not so far been used by other functional grammarians, so far as I know.² In particular, whenever we find an **embedded** clause, we shall ask if it is functioning as a PR in a higher clause, and if so, what role it fills. It is this strategy of applying the concept of PRs to all uses of the verb *be* that provides the key to solving the syntactic problems associated with a wide range of well-known problems in syntax analysis.

One side-effect of placing the emphasis on providing a **functional** analysis - 'functional' in both senses outlined above - is that we place less emphasis than many other grammarians would on the importance of differences in the INTERNAL structures of embedded clauses. What matters most is to determine the function that each element serves in the functional structure of a higher unit - and a question such as whether a clause is a *that*-clause, a *to*-clause or an *-ing*-clause is secondary. While such contrasts of structure certainly do realize differences of meaning - as differences of form almost always do - such matters are, in comparison, relatively minor details.³ So, for example, in *I prefer (it) that he leaves now*, *I prefer him to leave now* and *I prefer him leaving now (rather than later)*, the portions *that he should leave now*, *him to leave now* and *him leaving now* are all Complements to *prefer*.

2 The logical forms of special constructions

All of the syntactic constructions to be presented in the next chapter are generated from a higher level of representation, which is known as the **logical form**. We met this concept first in Chapter 16 (XXX not Chapter 1 or 2?), but we have not needed to use it much since then. However it will be necessary to bring it in occasionally here in Part C, in order to gain a clear picture of what the special constructions are for and how they work. But, since this is a handbook about functional syntax rather than logical form, we shall keep the references to logical form to the minimum. We shall find that, for our present purposes, we can represent the logical form adequately by using the nearest equivalent form of

English, and so avoid having to learn the technicalities of representing the sentence at that 'higher' level - which is, after all, not the topic of this book.

XXX THE MATERIAL THAT ORIGINALLY APPEARED HERE HAS BEEN COPIED TO CHAPTER 16 (ON NOMINALISATIONS) SO I HAVE 'SUMMARISED' IT HERE (WITH ONLY A LITTLE SHORTENING OF THE ORIGINAL. MAKE A FINAL CHECK THAT IT TIES UP CLEARLY.

Here, then, is a brief summary of what we need to have in mind. So far in this book we have regularly referred to **situations**, which is what **clauses** typically realize, and to **things**, which are typically realized by **nominal groups** - with similar 'meaning-form' pairs of terms for the other units. Here, 'typically' means 'congruently' - i.e. we have at various points noted **incongruent** realizations, especially in Chapter 16. As we saw in Chapter 2, these two levels of 'meaning' and 'form' are both within the **lexicogrammar**, i.e. within language itself. The level of meaning is the **semantics**, where the meaning potential of the language is specified through the system networks of semantic features. And the level of **form** includes syntax, items, and intonation (or punctuation) - and of these three we are focussing in this handbook on syntax. So semantics and form are the two levels that we have worked with so far. But in Chapter 16 we added, as a separate component above that, the **logical form** that constitutes the input to (and output from) the language system itself. Logical form is used to represent 'knowledge' or, better, **beliefs** in what is termed the **belief system**. The belief system is held to be closely related to the language by which most beliefs are learned, so it is not surprising that the nature of logical form is itself strongly influenced by the nature of language - and that it contains units that correspond systematically (though not in a one-to-one relationship) to the units of language. To oversimplify a little, we can say that the principle relations are those shown in Figure 1.




Figure 1: The relations of elements of logical form to language

Figure 1 shows the main incongruences between the logical form and the system networks of meaning. Thus, as we saw in Chapter 16, events in logical form are not always expressed as situations in the semantics, and so in clauses; they are also often expressed as 'nominalizations' (and so as nominal groups) and as 'event noun senses' (and so in turn as 'event nouns').

The reason why we need to bring logical form into the picture is that most of the constructions to be analyzed in the next chapter are related to one or more other constructions that have **THE SAME LOGICAL FORM**. In some cases, however, they do NOT share the same logical form, but there are nonetheless systematic **logical equivalences** between the logical forms associated with the two constructions.⁴

The important point here is that, for each of the constructions that we shall meet in the next chapter, there is always a relatively simple equivalent in logical form. (Sometimes it is not quite as simple as some grammarians have assumed in the past.) Quite often there is a form of language that expresses these simpler structures directly - but not always, and this is one of the reasons why these constructions cause problems for the grammarian. In many cases the simple English equivalent feels clumsy, and so it is little used. In others there is no acceptable equivalent at all in the syntax of English.

In this handbook we are concerned with syntax rather than logical form, so in the explanations of the constructions we shall try to avoid getting involved with logical form. We shall therefore express the key ideas in terms of the equivalent natural forms of English (even if they are unusual or do not actually occur).

Some of these constructions have acquired a significance in the study of English syntax that seems disproportionate. This occurred because, in the past, many grammarians tried to find ways of capturing, at the level of **syntax**, equivalences that are better seen as being at the level of **logical form**. Indeed, many formal linguists still try to capture at the level of syntax patterns that can be seen, in a fuller model of language and beliefs, to be better related at a higher level than the lexicogrammar itself.⁵ There are relatively standard names, therefore, for many of the constructions. The problem with these names is that most of them reflect the concept of the syntactic transformation - i.e. the idea that **FIRST** one syntactic construction is generated, and that it is **LATER** 'transformed' into another. Here we shall take a different approach. Indeed, we shall suggest that some of the equivalences proposed in the transformational literature are not as direct as is often assumed, and we will propose other equivalences that fit more naturally with a functional approach. In the proposals that follow, then, many apparent equivalences at the level of the **form** of language are regarded as, as it were, 'secondary equivalences', and they are better regarded as the reflection of a higher equivalence.

In the next chapter we shall deal first with several constructions where (1) a non-referring *it* fills the Subject and (2) the Main Verb is a form of *be*. A major purpose of most of these constructions is to enable the P of a sentence to present one

particular role as being strongly enhanced. But, as we shall see, the constructions often serve other useful functions at the same time. In some cases the 'special construction' has, through the historical process of language change, become the strongly preferred choice for a construction, and in some cases it has become obligatory in modern English - and so no longer a matter of choice.

Here we shall show that a small set of just **FOUR** general principles can be used to explain these special constructions. These four, however, are in addition to a more general principle that guides the general organization of syntax.

3 The basic principle

The basic principle in producing text-sentences is:

Once you have begun on a syntactic unit that refers to a particular event or object, complete it before starting on another unit (other than units that are embedded within it) - unless there is a good reason not to do so.

This is the **Complete the unit** principle (which could also be called the 'Minimize discontinuity' principle). It is so obviously helpful to follow this principle that it is hardly ever mentioned (XXX Check Leech, Q et al, Huddleston & Pullum, Hawkins.) It is helpful to both the Performer and the Addressee. It helps the Performer, because as she completes one unit before starting on another she can package it as a single unit and so have less difficulty in remembering where she is in the generation of her text-sentence. And it is helpful to the Addressee, who is trying to work out the syntactic relations between the many items in the stream of incoming words, for exactly the same reason.

I am assuming here, therefore, that the set of reasons that lead a Performer to present an element EARLY in the structure of a clause, i.e. to thematize it, are handled within the constraints of this principle. And I am similarly assuming that the reasons for presenting an element relatively LATE in the clause, so that it has the potential to receive the unmarked Tonic that would mark it as 'new' information, operate within this general principle. Neither of the sets of motivations for placing elements early or late in the clause affect the general principle, because they all operate WITHIN THE UNIT.

But what are the 'good reasons' that might upset this sensible basic principle of 'Complete the unit, unless there is a good reason not to do so'? They are the four principles that are described in this chapter. It is these very general principles that underlie the theory of syntax that is outlined in my *A Theory of Syntax for Systemic Functional Linguistics*, as summarized in Part D of this book - and so this *Handbook*. Our concern here, then, is just with those principles that are required to understand the special constructions.

4 The four principles that lead to 'special constructions'

The four principles are:

- 1 The '**Get the pivotal element in soon**' principle.
- 2 The **End Weight** principle.
- 3 The **Enhanced Theme** principle.
- 4 The **Theme raised from report** principle.

I shall now summarize each in turn.

Principle 1: The '**Get the pivotal element in soon**' principle

Here - as in most linguistic theories - we recognize that the key element needed by the Addressee in working out the Participant Roles of a clause is the Main Verb - and that it is also important - though to a lesser extent - in working out the Circumstantial Roles. This means that it is helpful to A if P introduces the Main Verb as soon as possible. We have seen, in Chapter 3, that the first priority in most clauses in a typical text in English is to establish the MOOD (by the relationship of the Subject to the Operator or Main Verb). So it is very often the case that only the Subject precedes the Main Verb. Occasionally, of course, there is also one of the following: a Linker, Binder, *Wh*-element, thematized Adjunct or, more rarely still, a Complement - or an Operator or Auxiliary. Occasionally we find three or even more of these present in one clause, but typically it is just one or two. (XXX Check stats in ICQF and insert the relevant %)) What's more, you will notice that almost all of these elements are directly expounded by items, and that these items are typically very short - most having only one syllable. Thus, in *It is obvious that Ike loves Ivy*, having the item *it* as Subject enables us to reach the Main verb much more quickly than would be possible if the Carrier was the Subject, i.e. if the clause *that Ike loves Ivy* was the Subject. This first general principle is therefore at work in this construction, which can be called the **Get the pivotal element in soon** principle. In the case of Construction 1 in the next section, the 'pivotal element' is the Main Verb, but in later constructions we shall see it at work in relation to the head of the nominal group.

Principle 2: The end weight principle

Here we shall treat as a single principle the overlap between what some other approaches present as two separate principles.⁶ The value of the present approach is that it make it clear WHY one of the two principles that are distinguished by others is as it is. In fact, as we will shortly see, one of them is the **realization** of the other. The second and more form-related half of the single principle to be recognized here is in fact part of a much wider principle - one which, as we shall see, we have already met briefly in Chapter 4. It will explained more fully in Section 4 of this chapter.

When a Participant Role in a clause (e.g. a Carrier) is filled by an embedded

clause, it is typically considerably more complex, both syntactically and semantically, than it would be if it was simply filled by a group. To see why this is almost inevitably so, consider the clause *that her daughter is remarkably clever*, which fills the Subject - and so the Carrier - in (1).

(1) That her daughter is remarkably clever is obvious.

As this example illustrates, a single clause typically contains one or more groups - here, the nominal group *her daughter* and the quality group *remarkably clever*. Since most clauses contain groups, it is self-evidently true that a clause typically expresses the result of many more semantic choices than a group does - first its own semantic choices and realizations, and then the semantic choices and realizations of two or more groups. So typically a clause has more **semantic weight** than a group.⁷

We can demonstrate that the embedded clause in (1) has considerable 'semantic weight' by comparing (1) with (2):

(2) That is obvious.

If P utters (2), she has decided that she does not need to employ the full semantic complexity of a situation realized in a clause, and that A will be able to recover the full situation from P's use of the form *that*.

However, the fact is that the material in (1) is more often expressed in the form shown in (3):

(3) It is obvious that her daughter is remarkably clever.

This is an example of the first type of special construction to be considered in the next chapter, so we shall not analyze it here. What (3) illustrates clearly is the **end-weight principle**, i.e. the semantically weighty clause *that her daughter is remarkably clever* appears at the end of the higher clause of which it is a part. The question is: "Why does it?"

Now we come to the link from this concept to the more general one. When an embedded clause has semantic weight, it is virtually certain that P has chosen to present the referent in this way because at least some of the information it contains is **new information**, i.e. information that P believes that A could not have easily predicted, at that point in the development of that text.⁸ If this was not the case, P would have used a form such as (2).

At this point we must state one of the most basic facts of the semantics and syntax of English. It is one that is relevant in the construction of all clauses, not just embedded clauses of the type being considered here. This is the principle that, unless there are even stronger principles to be followed, material which is to be presented as **new information** should come at the end of the clause. And the reason for this is that, in the vast majority of cases, the final element in a clause

includes the marker of 'new information' that by definition occurs in every **information unit**, and so in every **intonation unit** - and so in most clauses - i.e. the **Tonic**. (See Section 4 of this chapter for a fuller - but still brief - outline of what we need to know about intonation in order to understand the ideas presented in the next chapter.)

This principle of placing semantically weighty elements at the end of the clause is regularly referred to as the **End Weight** principle (e.g. Quirk et al. 1985), and we shall find that it has a role to play in several of the special constructions to be examined in the next chapter.⁹

Principle 3: The Enhanced Theme principle

The status of an Attribute as theme can be greatly enhanced by the use of an *It + be* construction. It gives it a 'redoubled' thematic status. First, in our example, the Attribute *obvious* is foregrounded as a 'marked theme' simply through coming first (rather as in *Obvious it is not*). Second, the words *it is / was* provide additional thematic foregrounding by the device of explicitly signalling that an unexpected theme is about to be presented. We will call the delaying effect of waiting while these short items are processed **thematic build-up**. Thus, ANY role which receives thematic build-up - i.e. which is introduced by *it is/was* etc.- has the status of being an **Enhanced Theme**. However, there are several different types of 'enhanced theme', as we will see in the next chapter, and for each this is typically more than one reason for selecting it.

The 'lower level' half of Principle 2 is also satisfied by this construction, and it therefore confirms the value of using it. In the present case, it is no more than a supporting principle. but it will be the major principle behind the explanation of a later construction.

Principle 4: The Theme raised from report principle

Under given conditions, it possible to raise certain elements from an embedded clause so that they operate in the highest clause in the sentence. Specifically, P may decide to raise the **sought role** in a clause embedded in the Phenomenon of a clause in which the Main Verb reports a feeling, a thought or a saying to the status of 'sought' role in the highest clause. Example (4) illustrates the construction, but the explanation of its structure will be left to the next chapter.^b

Like Principle 3, this principle involves the thematization of an element, but it is not a type of enhanced theme, so that it must be treated separately.

b. There is an apparently similar phenomenon that is also treated as a type of 'raising' in formal-generative grammars. This is so-called 'Subject to Subject raising', as in *She is said / thought / felt to be a spy*. But in such cases the underlined items have meanings that are close to *She is bound / likely / certain to be a spy*. Both types are handled in this Handbook as direct elements of the clause - see Chapter 13.

(4) When do you think he got there?

5 The essentials of intonation and its meanings

Before we come to the principles themselves, it will be useful to remind ourselves of some of the basic facts about **intonation** that have been mentioned earlier - and to add a few more facts to fill out the picture sufficiently for what we shall need in the next chapter.

In terms of Figure 1, intonation is at the level of **form**, and the meanings that it realizes are, naturally, at the level of **meaning**, i.e. semantics.¹⁰ When the Performer (P) is making the decisions in her planning that will determine the choices in the system networks at the level of semantics, P assigns **information units** to the various **semantic units** that are being generated - and so, with some minor adjustments at the boundaries, to the corresponding **syntactic units**. There is, by definition, at least one information unit in each sentence, and very often there are several. Part of P's task in uttering or writing any sentence is to estimate, for each semantic unit that is generated within it, whether it should be given a separate information unit. The criterion in this decision is, in principle, P's estimate of the informational needs of the Addressee (A) - though performers inevitably misjudge the needs of their Addressees from time to time. Typically, but by no means always, P will decide that if a text-sentence has more than one clause P will give each **clause** its own **information unit**.

In **speech**, each information unit is realized by an **intonation unit**. The equivalent in **writing** is the unit boundaries that are expressed by **punctuation marks** - i.e. commas, dashes colons and semi-colons within sentences, and full stops ('periods' in US English), question marks and exclamations marks at the ends of sentences.

From here on we shall focus on intonation rather than punctuation. This is because, even when the text is a written text, the reader tends to read into it the intonation with which it would be spoken if it were read aloud - so that even with a written text it is helpful to understand the meanings built into a spoken text.

Each information unit contains just one element that is overtly marked as **New**. In the default case - i.e. unless there is a good reason why it should not - the overt marking of this 'newness' occurs on the LAST lexical item of the clause element (or of a lower unit) that P is presenting as containing 'new' information. The meaning is that P is presenting AT LEAST that element of clause structure as information that is 'new' to A. A lot more of the previous may be new too, and when you are analyzing a text you can sometimes work out what else is new from other evidence, such as the use of pronouns. How is 'newness realized? By simply placing a **Tonic** on the salient ('strong') syllable of the last lexical item (with a few minor qualifications that we shall ignore here).

Before we go further, I shall say a little more about what 'newness' is. The

concept of 'new' information is taken directly from Halliday (e.g. Halliday 1985/94), and nowadays it is widely used (e.g. in Quirk et al 1985). But is not always properly understood by all those who use the term. The key point to remember is that P can legitimately present information as 'new', even when it has been mentioned quite recently in the text, IF IT IS NOT FULLY PREDICTABLE BY THE ADDRESSEE AT THAT POINT IN THE TEXT - and so in the current sentence. So 'new' does NOT mean 'unmentioned'. And nor, for similar reasons, does Halliday's other term 'given' necessarily mean 'mentioned in the preceding text', it may be recoverable from the observable situation. And, conversely, it is possible for something to have been referred to recently in the text, but still to be presented as 'new', on the grounds that it is not expected at that point - as, for example, with *myself* in *In the end I had to do it myself*.

How do you recognize a Tonic? The answer is that it is the syllable at which there is the greatest pitch change in each intonation unit - and it is easiest to learn to recognize a Tonic by considering examples where there is just one clause in a sentence, and just one intonation unit. The Tonic is underlined in the following examples:

- (1) Ike wants a pizza.
- (2) He wants a really big one.
- (3) Shall we have a bottle of wine?

A Tonic is like an element of structure in syntax, in that it needs something else to give it a physical form. That 'something else' is a **Tone**. So a Tonic can be located though the Tone that is associated with it. Here we shall introduce just two Tones, with variations within each: a falling Tone, represented as '1', and a rising Tone represented as '2'. A high falling Tone is shown as '1+', and a low falling Tone as '1-', etc.

There are in fact THREE types of **Tonic** that we need to identify (each of which can occur with both falling and rising Tones). The first is the **Mood-bearing Tonic (MT)**. Each text-sentence has ONE - AND ONLY ONE - Mood-bearing Tonic, and it performs two tasks. The first is to mark information as New, as described above, and the second is to express certain refinements of meaning in MOOD through the choice of Tone. So, in Examples (1) and (2) above, the MOOD is that of 'information giver', but in (3) it is a 'proposal for joint action'. The Tone is likely to be Tone 1 in (1) and (2), but it is more likely to be Tone 2 in (3).

It is an interesting fact that, in a string of co-ordinated clauses, only the last one has a Mood-bearing Tonic, i.e. a Tonic that expresses the MOOD. Any earlier Tonics that occur express various aspects of the **information status** of the information unit, such as 'unfinished', etc. (We shall return to this briefly in a moment.) Rather similarly, when a sentence contains one or more embedded clauses, the MT is always a part of the matrix clause. Putting these two facts together, we can say that the MT is always located in the last matrix clause of the sentence.

I have said that the placement of the Mood-bearing Tonic on the last lexical item is the 'default', so we must ask: "What circumstances could overrule this?" The answer is that when P wishes to CORRECT A POSSIBLE MIS-PERCEPTION by A, P will sometimes refer to something as not merely 'new', but as **Contrastively New (CNew)**. As an example, consider the exchange in (4):

- (4) A: Ivy and Ike both want a lasagne (MT).
B: No; Ike wants a pizza (CN).

Here *a pizza* is presented as Contrastively New, and the meaning is something like 'Ike wants a pizza - and NOT a lasagne, or anything else in that line'. In such cases the Tone is likely to be a high fall (assuming an 'information giver'). To generalize, we can say that when an element is marked as 'Contrastively New' this means 'I am referring to A - and NOT to B, C or D, as you may be thinking' - whether or not that contrast is made explicit in the text.

Notice that, although the words *Ike wants a pizza* occur in both (1) and (4), the words *Ike wants a* would typically be spoken rather differently in each case - in the first case, stepping down steadily from a fairly high start, but in the second case spoken on a low pitch. These 'pre-tonic' patterns correlate with the likely difference in the Tone in each case. In (1) the Tone is likely to fall from a mid pitch, but in (4) it is likely to fall from a high pitch. So you can normally identify the difference between a Mood-bearing Tonic and a Contrastive Tonic by both the Tone itself and the pattern in the 'pre-tonic' segment.

In B's utterance in (4) the element presented as Contrastively New contains the final lexical item. But typically it is NOT the final lexical item - and in such cases the difference is even easier to see. Consider (5):

- (5) A: So am I right that Ike wants a lasagne (MT2).
B: No (MT2); it's a pizza (CT1+) that he wants.

Here, as in example (4), there is a high fall on *pizza* - but in this case the words that follow are spoken on a low pitch, as a part of the 'tail' of the Tone that expresses the CN. This is because they are fully recoverable from the context, i.e. the Performer believes that the Addressee knows that the P is talking about 'what Ike wants'. So a **Contrastive Tonic** at the level of FORM expresses the MEANING of **Contrastively New**. The final point about the Contrastive Tonic is that whenever there is a CT, this REPLACES the MT, so that there is no MT in that intonation unit. The MOOD meaning is expressed through the CT.

However, MTs and CTs are not the only kinds of Tonics. Along with either there may be one or more **simple Tonics (T)**, and when there is these are always connected with the **status** of the information in the additional information unit whose presence they mark. The same set of rising and falling Tones is used, but with a different set of meanings. We shall not go into these here, except to say that one that we shall need in the next chapter is when a rising Tone is used with an information unit to signify 'This is supplementary information' (to slightly over-

simplify).

Figure 2 summarises the relationship between the following:

- (a) the status of information in the **belief system** (which must ultimately be expressed in terms of the Performer's beliefs about what the Addressee knows - or, sometimes, what P PURPORTS to believe about A's state of information);
- (b) the level of **semantics**, and
- (c) the level of **form**.

Here we shall say nothing more about the various sources in the belief system by which information comes to be evaluated as 'novel', 'presupposed' or 'recoverable', but we shall need to discuss these concepts a little more fully in the next chapter.¹¹




Figure 2: A simplified summary of the origins of the three types of Tonic

To summarize: there is always a Mood-bearing Tonic (MT) in each sentence, unless it is replaced by a Contrastive Tonic (CT), and there may be other Tonics associated with the 'information status' of other information units within the sentence (T). Each Tonic signifies the presence of New information, and in the case of an intonation unit containing a MT or T this may extend over many elements as well as the one in which the MT or T occurs. In the case of a Contrastive Tonic it is only the element in which it occurs that is marked as 'Contrastively New'. The final MT or CT carries the Tone that expresses a MOOD meaning.

References

Halliday, M.A.K., and Hasan, R., 1976. *Cohesion in English*. London: Longman.

Prince, E., 1981. 'Towards a taxonomy of given-new information'. In Cole, P.,

(ed.) *Radical Pragmatics*, New York: Academic Press.

1. While the principles to be set out here are related to those found in the writings of Leech (in Leech 1983 and Quirk *et al.* 1985) a comparison of the two sets will show a number of significant differences.

2. See Fawcett and Huang 1995:116-7 for our critique of Halliday's analyses of what he terms 'predicated themes'. Halliday does at one stage suggest this as one type of analysis, but he then suggests others that are not compatible with it. See the section on Construction 2 in the next chapter for my analysis of the construction exemplified in *it was a badger that we saw*.

3. From the present viewpoint, for example, we would say that many grammarians in the past have placed too much emphasis on the fact that some types of embedded clause happen to share many of the detailed characteristics of 'relative clauses'. In the view taken here the underlined clause in *It was Ivy that ate it* is not a 'relative clause', because there is no head to which it relates as a qualifier. See the discussion of Construction 2 in the next chapter.

4. One of the things, then, which a child or any other learner of a language must master is these 'logical equivalences'. These are equivalences which, by their nature, cannot be handled as choices in the system networks. An example is the relationship between the logical form of *That table has three legs* and *There are three legs on that table*.

5. *In my view, the key to the successful explanation of linguistic phenomena is to work with a model of language that is sufficiently full to enable one to model each phenomenon at its appropriate level, in relation to each other level. This is not an approach that fits naturally with Chomsky's superficially attractive decision to overhaul the cumbersome apparatus that his Principles and Parameters approach had become, in his 'minimalist program(me)'. At the highest level of comparison, we can say that the concept of 'levels' in the generation and understanding of language has given Systemic Functional Linguistics the advantage over Principles and Parameters of having a layered structure.*

6. *These are the principles of 'end-focus' (Quirk et al 1985:1366-7) and 'end-weight' (Quirk et al 1985:1361-2). While Quirk et al present and illustrate the two as separate principles, they move some way towards the position presented here when they say: 'Since the new information often needs to be stated more fully than the given (that is, with a longer, 'heavier' structure), it is not unexpected that an organisation principle which may be termed END-WEIGHT comes into operation along with the principle of end-focus.'*

7. We must say 'typically', because(1) a clause can occasionally consist of no more than a Process, and so have only a Main verb, and (2) groups are regularly quite complex - especially since a group may itself include one or more embedded clauses.

8. Note that new information, in the technical sense introduced and defined by Halliday, is not necessarily information whose content is unknown to A, as some researchers have assumed in the past, and certainly not information that has not been mentioned in the text, as others have assumed. The key concept is that of whether P is presenting the information to A as 'predictable at that moment'. Compare the formulation in Halliday 1994: 296: 'Information, in this technical grammatical sense, is the tension between what is already known or predictable and what is unknown or unpredictable.'

9. The name 'end weight' is not perfect, because it omits the key concept that the 'end' position is important only because of its potential to coincide with being marked as **new information**. But it has the two advantages of (1) being an established term and (2) being short. So, since it is not positively misleading, we shall use it here.

10. The approach to intonation and its meanings taken here follows the proposals of Tench (1990), which are themselves a revised and, in my view, improved version of Halliday's proposals

(e.g. as summarized in Halliday 1985/94). Some further modifications have been introduced by myself, under the stimulus of implementing Tench's description in a explicit computer model, as described in Fawcett (1990).

11. For these, see Halliday and Hasan 1976 for anaphoric, cataphoric, exophoric and homophoric reference, and Prince 1976 for her categories. Note that in the view taken here, these are all categories that it is useful to distinguish as sources of information for the Addressee, which it is the Performer's task to evaluate the relevance of.