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Our programme and a summary of the conference aims.


Recent philosophical analyses of implicit cognition and the origins of intuitions tend to rely, whether implicitly or explicitly, on some form of dual-process model.

According to dual-process models, the high-speed cognition that shapes our intuitive judgments and inattentive behaviour is produced through a process that is distinct in kind from the one that produces attentive rational deliberation. Although this picture remains influential in empirically informed epistemology and ethics, it has come under significant pressure in cognitive psychology, where connectionist and predictivist models of cognition now dominate.

The aim of this conference is collectively to rethink these issues in empirically informed epistemology and ethics in the light of this development in the theory of cognition. We are particularly concerned with how the cognition underlying belief formation and moral judgment is best modelled, whether and in what ways that cognition is rational, and the implications of this for certain current issues in ethics, epistemology, and politics.


Daniel Andler (Paris-Sorbonne)Tacit Knowledge and Subpersonal Processes
James Andow (Reading)A Genealogy of Intuitions
Matteo Colombo (Tilburg)Inferential Reasoning in Predictive Brains
Elizabeth David-Barrett (Sussex)Conflict of Interest and the Psychology of Judgment
Keith Frankish (Open)One System, Two Minds
Kristjàn Kristjànsson (Birmingham)Why Aristotle Was Not a Two-System Dualist
Christos Kyriacou (Cyprus)Dual Processing Moral Judgment: Between the Intuitive and the Reflective
Alberto Masala (Paris-Sorbonne)Authenticity and Practical Reason
Mara Neijzen (Edinburgh)How (and Where) Does Moral Judgment Work within Radical Embodied Cognition?
Clea Rees (Cardiff)Virtuous Uncertainty about Certain Intuitions
Simon Robertson (Cardiff)Ethical Judgments and Subjective Motivations
Hanno Sauer (Duisberg-Essen)Debunking and Vindicating Moral Intuitions
Nicholas Shackel (Cardiff)What Makes a Rational Intuition Rational?
András Szigeti (Linköping)Emotions as Heuristics
Alessandra Tanesini (Cardiff)Virtues and Vices of Thinking Fast and Slow
Jonathan Webber (Cardiff)Reasoning in Implicit Bias
Anna Welpinghus (Technische Universität Dortmund)A Two-level Framework for Understanding Implicit Bias