Dr Orestis Palermos

Lecturer

School of English, Communication and Philosophy

: palermoss@cardiff.ac.uk
: +44 (0)29 2087 0418
: 1.44, John Percival Building, Colum Drive, Cardiff, CF10 3EU

: Available for postgraduate supervision

I work at the intersection of philosophy of mind and cognitive science, epistemology, philosophy of science and philosophy of technology. I am interested in the idea of philosophical engineering: the way philosophy can impact the design of emerging technologies and socio-technical systems.

I joined Cardiff University as a Lecturer in 2017. Before that, I was a postdoctoral fellow at the University of Edinburgh. My PhD and MSc in Philosophy are from the University of Edinburgh, where I was supervised by Duncan Pritchard, Andy Clark and Mark Sprevak. I also hold a BSc and MSc in Chemical Engineering from the National Technical University of Athens.

To find out more about my research and projects, you can visit my personal website.

2017 - Present: Lecturer in Philosophy, Cardiff University
2016 - 2017: Postdoctoral fellow for the Philosophy, Science and Religion Online Project, Eidyn Centre, University of Edinburgh.
2013 - 2015: Postdoctoral fellow for the Extended Knowledge Project, Eidyn Centre, University of Edinburgh.
2009 - 2012: PhD in Philosophy, University of Edinburgh.
2008 - 2009: MSc in Philosophy, University of Edinburgh.
2002 - 2008: BSc & MSc in Chemical Engineering, National Technical University of Athens.
1998 - 2006: Diploma in Classical Piano, Musical Horizons Conservatory, Athens, Greece.

2021

Palermos, S. O. 2021. System reliabilism and basic beliefs: defeasible, undefeated and likely to be true. Synthese (10.1007/s11229-021-03090-y)

2020

Palermos, S. 2020. Epistemic collaborations: distributed cognition and virtue reliabilism. Erkenntnis (10.1007/s10670-020-00258-9)
Palermos, S. and Kotzee, B. 2020. The teacher bandwidth problem: MOOCs, connectivism and collaborative knowledge. Educational Theory

2018

Carter, J. A. et al. eds. 2018. Socially extended epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Palermos, S. 2018. New humans: ethics, trust and the extended mind. In: Carter, J. A. et al. eds. Extended Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press
Carter, J. A. et al. eds. 2018. Extended epistemology. Oxford University Press.
Palermos, S. O. 2018. Epistemic presentism. Philosophical Psychology 31(3), pp. 458-478. (10.1080/09515089.2018.1432035)
Palermos, S. O. and Tollefsen, D. 2018. Group know-how. In: Carter, J. A. et al. eds. Socially Extended Epistemology. Oxford University Press

2017

Palermos, S. O. 2017. Social machines: a philosophical engineering. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 16(5), pp. 953-978. (10.1007/s11097-016-9489-4)
Palermos, S. O., Carter, A. and Collin, J. 2017. Semantic inferentialism as (a form of) active externalism. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 16(3), pp. 387-402. (10.1007/s11097-016-9458-y)
Palermos, S. 2017. Augmented skepticism: the epistemological design of augmented reality. In: Augmented Reality. Reflections on its Contribution to Knowledge Formation De Gruyter (series: Berlin Studies in Knowledge Research). De Gruyter (Berlin & New York)

2016

Carter, J. A. and Palermos, S. O. 2016. Is having your computer compromised a personal assault? The ethics of extended cognition. Journal of the American Philosophical Association 2(4), pp. 542-560. (10.1017/apa.2016.28)
Palermos, S. O. 2016. The dynamics of group cognition. Minds and Machines 26, pp. 409-440. (10.1007/s11023-016-9402-5)
Carter, J. A. and Palermos, S. O. 2016. Epistemic internalism, content externalism and the subjective/objective justification distinction. American Philosophical Quarterly 53(3), pp. 231-244.
Palermos, S. O. 2016. Spreading the credit: virtue reliabilism and weak epistemic anti-individualism. Erkenntnis 81(2), pp. 305-334. (10.1007/s10670-015-9741-2)
Carter, J. A., Gordon, E. C. and Palermos, S. O. 2016. Extended emotion. Philosophical Psychology 29(2), pp. 198-217. (10.1080/09515089.2015.1063596)
Palermos, S. O. and Pritchard, D. 2016. The distribution of epistemic agency. In: Reider, P. J. ed. Social Epistemology and Epistemic Agency Decentralizing Epistemic Agency. Collective Studies in Knowledge and Society Rowman & Littlefield, pp. 109-126.

2015

Carter, J. A. and Palermos, S. O. 2015. Active externalism and epistemic internalism. Erkenntnis 80(4), pp. 753-772. (10.1007/s10670-014-9670-5)
Palermos, S. O. 2015. Active externalism, virtue reliabilism and scientific knowledge. Synthese 192(9), pp. 2955-2986. (10.1007/s11229-015-0695-3)
Palermos, S. O. 2015. Could reliability naturally imply safety?. European Journal of Philosophy 23(4), pp. 1192-1208. (10.1111/ejop.12046)

2014

Palermos, S. O.et al. 2014. Varieties of externalism. Philosophical Issues 24(1), pp. 63-109. (10.1111/phis.12026)
Palermos, S. O. 2014. Knowledge and cognitive integration. Synthese 191(8), pp. 1931-1951. (10.1007/s11229-013-0383-0)
Palermos, S. O. 2014. Loops, constitution, and cognitive extension. Cognitive Systems Research. 27, pp. 25-41. (10.1016/j.cogsys.2013.04.002)

2013

Palermos, S. O. and Pritchard, D. 2013. Extended knowledge and social epistemology. Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 2(8), pp. 105-120.

2011

Palermos, S. O. 2011. Belief-forming processes, extended. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2(4), pp. 741-765. (10.1007/s13164-011-0075-y)

2010

Palermos, S. O. 2010. Dualism in the epistemology of testimony and the ability intuition. Philosophia 39(3), pp. 597-613. (10.1007/s11406-010-9291-4)

Past and Present Modules:

Artificial Intelligence (PG)

Advanced Topics in Epistemology (PG)

Philosophy of Science (UG)

Moral and Political Philosophy (UG)

Cognition and Technology (UG)

Philosophy Through Great Texts (UG)

Supervision:

I welcome PhD proposals on philosophy of mind and cognitive science, epistemology and philosophy of technology.

Publications:

Edited Books

2018. Socially Extended Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press. With J. A. Carter, A. Clark, J. Kallestrup, and D. Pritchard.

2018 Extended Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press. With J. A. Carter, A. Clark, J. Kallestrup, and D. Pritchard.

Journal Articles

Forthcoming. Epistemic Collaborations: Distributed Cognition and Virtue Reliabilism. Erkenntnis. (PDF)

2018. Epistemic Presentism. Philosophical Psychology. 31(3), 458-478. (PDF) (DOI)

2017. Social Machines: A Philosophical Engineering. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences. 16(5), 953–978 (PDF) (DOI)

2017. Semantic Inferentialism as (a Form of) Active Externalism. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences. 16(3): 387 - 402. With Adam Carter and Jamie Collin. (PDF) (DOI)

2016. Is Having Your Computer Compromised a Personal Assault? The Ethics of Extended Cognition. The Journal of the American Philosophical Association. 2 (4) 542-560. With Adam Carter. (PDF)

2016. Epistemic Internalism, Content Externalism and the Subjective/Objective Justification Distinction. American Philosophical Quarterly. 53 (3):231-244. With Adam Carter. (PDF).

2016. The Dynamics of Group Cognition. Minds and Machines. 26(4), 409-440. (PDF) (DOI).

2016. Spreading the Credit: Virtue Reliabilism and Weak Epistemic Anti-Individualism. Erkenntnis. 81(2): 305-334. (PDF) (DOI)

2015. Active Externalism, Virtue Reliabilism and Scientific Knowledge. Synthese. 192: 2955. (PDF) (DOI)

2015. Could Reliability Naturally Imply Safety?, European Journal of Philosophy. 23 (4): 1192–1208. (PDF) (DOI)

2015. Active Externalism and Epistemic Internalism. Erkenntnis. 80 (4): 753–772. With Adam Carter. (PDF) (DOI)

2015. Extended Emotion. Philosophical Psychology. 29 (2): 198-217. With Emma Gordon and Adam Carter. (PDF) (DOI)

2014. Knowledge and Cognitive Integration. Synthese. 191(8): 1931-1951. (PDF) (DOI)

2014. Varieties of Externalism. Philosophical Issues, 24(1), 63-109. With Adam Carter, Jesper Kallestrup and Duncan Pritchard. (PDF) (DOI)

2014. Loops, Constitution, and Cognitive Extension. Cognitive Systems Research. 27: 25-41. (PDF) (DOI)

2013. Extended Knowledge and Social Epistemology. Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective. 2 (8): 105-120. With Duncan Pritchard. (PDF) (DOI)

2011. Belief-Forming Processes, Extended. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 2 (4): 741-765. (PDF) (DOI)

2011. Dualism in the Epistemology of Testimony and the Ability Intuition, Philosophia, Vol. 39 (3): 597-613. (PDF) (DOI)

Book Chapters

Forthcoming. Bees Do It; Distributed Cognition and Psychophysical Laws. In Handbook for Distributed Team Cognition. McNeese, M., Salas, E., and Endsley, M. (eds.). CRC Taylor and Francis). (PDF)

2018. Group Know-How. In Socially Extended Epistemology. J. Adam Carter, Andy Clark, Jesper Kallestrup, S. Orestis Palermos and Duncan Pritchard (eds.). Oxford University Press. With Deborah Tollefsen. (PDF)

2018. New Humans: Ethics, Trust and the Extended Mind. In Extended Epistemology. J. Adam Carter, Andy Clark, Jesper Kallestrup, S. Orestis Palermos and Duncan Pritchard (eds.). Oxford University Press. With Andy Clark and Adam Carter. (PD F)

2017. Augmented Skepticism: The Epistemological Design of Augmented Reality. In Augmented Reality. Reflections on its Contribution to Knowledge Formation, José María Ariso (ed), 2017, De Gruyter (series: Berlin Studies in Knowledge Research), Berlin & New York. (PDF)

2016. The Distribution of Epistemic Agency. In Social Epistemology and Epistemic Agency: De-Centralizing Epistemic Agency. (ed.) P. Reider, (Rowman & Littlefield). With Duncan Pritchard. (PDF)

Edited Journal Issues

Forthcoming. Varieties of Externalism: Epistemic, Content, Vehicle. Special issue of American Philosophical Quarterly. With J. A. Carter, J. Kallestrup, and D. Pritchard)

Forthcoming. Knowledge, Virtue and Action: Eastern and Western Perspectives. Special issue of Synthese. With J. A. Carter, C. M, & D. Pritchard.

2014. Extended Knowledge. Special issue of Philosophical Issues, Vol. 24 (1): 1-482. With J. A. Carter, J. Kallestrup, D. Pritchard (DOI )

Reference Articles

2015. Active Externalism and Epistemology. Oxford Bibliographies Online. With J. A. Carter (PDF)|(DOI)

General Audience Articles

2015. To Google, or not to Google, During Exams. In Education Technology. With D. Pritchard