Ewch i’r prif gynnwys
Yr Athro Nicholas Shackel

Yr Athro Nicholas Shackel


Ysgol Saesneg, Cyfathrebu ac Athroniaeth

+44 (0)29 2087 5664
1.42, Adeilad John Percival , Rhodfa Colum, Caerdydd, CF10 3EU
Ar gael fel goruchwyliwr ôl-raddedig


I am a part of the School's Philosophy research group.

Additional publications


A problem for the unity of normativity’. Analysis. 74 Vol. (3) July 2014, 404-411

Published in refereed journals

The nought belief paradoxErkenntnis. Vol. 79 (3) June 2014, 523-529

Still waiting for a plausible Humean theory of reasonsPhilosophical Studies Vol. 167 (3) February 2014, 607-633

The fragility of freedom of speechJournal of Medical Ethics. May 2013 Vol. 39 316

Cold or Calculating? Reduced activity in the subgenual cingulate cortex reflects decreased emotional aversion to harming in counterintuitive utilitarian judgment’ (with Guy Kahane, Katja Wiech, Miguel Farias, Julian Savulescu, Irene Tracey) Cognition (2013) 126 (3) 364-372

The neural bases of intuitive and counterintuitive moral judgement’ (with Guy Kahane, Katja Wiech, Miguel Farias, Julian Savulescu, Irene Tracey) Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience Vol 7 (4) (2012) pp. 393-402

The world as a graph: defending graphical structuralismAnalysis Vol. 71 (1) January 2011 pp. 10-21

Methodological issues in the scientific study of moral judgement’ (with Guy Kahane) Mind and LanguageVol. 25 (5) November 2010 ISSN 0268-1064

Bangu’s Random Thoughts on Bertrand’s Paradox’ (with Darrell Rowbottom) Analysis Vol. 70 (4) October 2010 pp. 689-692 ISSN 0003-2638

‘Sophism and Pragmatism.’ Logique et Analyse Vol 53 No. 210 June 2010 pp 131-149 ISSN: 0024-5836

An fMRI study measuring analgesia enhanced by religion as a belief system’ (with Katja Wiech, Miguel Farias, Guy Kahane, Wiebke Tiede, Irene Tracey) Pain. 139 (2), pp. 467-76 October 2008.

Coherentism and the symmetry of epistemic supportAnalysis. Vol. 68 (3) July 2008 pp. 226-34.

Do abnormal responses show utilitarian bias?’ (with Guy Kahane) Nature. Vol. 452 (7185)  March 2008. pp. E5-E5.

Parting smoothly?Analysis. Vol. 67 (4) October 2007 pp. 321-24.

Bertrand’s Paradox and the Principle of IndifferencePhilosophy of Science. Vol. 74 (2) April 2007 pp. 150-175.

Shutting Dretske’s doorErkenntnis. (Accompanied by a reply from Dretske) Vol. 64 (3) May 2006 pps. 393-401.

The Dr. Psycho Paradox and Newcomb’s Problem’ (With Michael Clark) Erkenntnis. Vol. 64 (1) January 2006 pps. 85-100.

The Form of the Benardete Dichotomy.British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. Vol. 56 (2) June 2005 pps. 397-417.

The Vacuity of Postmodernist Methodology.’ Metaphilosophy. Vol. 36 April 2005 pps. 295-320.

 ‘Decision theory, Symmetry and Causal Structure’ (with Michael Clark), Mind Vol. 112 October 2003 pps. 691-701.

The Two-envelope Paradox.’ (with Michael Clark), Mind Vol. 109 July 2000 pps. 415-442.

Chapters in edited books

‘Pseudoscience and Idiosyncratic Theories of Rational Belief.’ In The Philosophy of Pseudoscience. Eds. Pigliucci, M. and Boudry, M. Chicago: Chicago University Press. 2013. pps. 417-38

‘Paradoxes of Probability.’ Handbook of Probability Theory with Applications. Ed. Tamas Rudas, Thousand Oaks: Sage. 2008. pps. 49-66.

 ‘Conceptual problems in the scientific study of belief’ (with Miguel Farias and Guy Kahane) Brain -- Religion -- Experience. Multidiscipline Encounters.  Ed. Christoph  Jaeger, Dordrecht, New York: Springer, Forthcoming.


‘Explaining variation in knowledge by full belief.’ Proceedings of the 34th Wittgenstein Symposium. Kirchberg, Austria. August 2011.

‘Two Rhetorical Manoeuvres’ Proceedings of the IL@25 conference. Windsor, Ontario, 2003.


Philosophical Theories of Probability by Donald Gillies’  Philosophical Books. Vol. 44 (1) Jan 2003.

Conference papers and talks

‘Hampton's need for the unity of normativity.’ Joint Session, Exeter University 2013

‘Stakes and full belief’ Joint Session, Stirling University, July 2012

 ‘Explaining variation in knowledge by full belief’ 34th International Wittgenstein Symposium, Kirchberg (Austria), from August 7-13, 2011

‘Two kinds of reasons’ Joint Session, University College, Dublin. July 2010

 ‘Objective Bayesianism, the Maximum Entropy Principle and Bertrand’s Paradox’ Lecture to the Formal Epistemology Project, Centre for Logic and Analytical Philosophy at the Institute of Philosophy at the University of Leuven. 30 April 2010

‘Epistemic Ethics’ Lecture, Projekthaus HumTec, RWTH University, Aachen. 29 April 2010

‘Neuroscience of moral judgement and its significance for normativity and law’, Neurosciences and Law Conference, Institute of Science and Ethics in Bonn at the Rheinisches Landesmuseum in Bonn on November 19th, 2009

The neuroscience of moral judgement’ Berlin School of Mind and Brain, Humboldt University, Berlin. 9 July 2009.

‘Reasons: rationalisers and justifiers’ Colloquium of Professor Thomas Schmidt, Institute für Philosophie, Humboldt University, Berlin, May 2009.

‘Reasons: rationalisers and justifiers’ Royal Insititue of Philosophy Research Seminar, University of Nottingham, 2009

 ‘Pluralism for the normativity of rationality’ University of Oxford seminar on Rationality and Normativity, June 2006.

‘Epistemic blame, public knowledge and epistemic duty’ James Martin Advanced Research Seminar, University of Oxford, 2006.

 ‘Society, artificial persons, rights and responsibility’ James Martin Advanced Research Seminar, University of Oxford, 2006.

 ‘On the obligation to be rational’ University of Oxford Moral Philosophy Seminar, 30 January 2006.

‘Reasons and rationality.’ Research Seminar, University of Bristol, 2005.

 ‘Two kinds of normativity.’ Research Seminar, University of Stirling, 2005.

‘Obligation and epistemic rationality’ Research Seminar, St Andrews University, 2005.

‘Two Rhetorical Manoeuvres’ Proceedings of the IL@25 conference. Windsor, Ontario, 2003.

 ‘Can Practical Reasons be as Velleman proposes?’ Research Seminar, University of Nottingham

 ‘Knowing when inductions are justified’ Research Seminar, University of Nottingham


I did my doctorate at the University of Nottingham, giving a Humean answer to the question of why we ought to be rational. I have lectured at the Universities of Nottingham, Warwick and Aberdeen and immediately prior to taking up my lectureship at Cardiff was a research fellow in the faculty of philosophy at Oxford.



















Research interests

Rationality and the relation of rationality and normativity. My work here includes practical reason and also the relation of rational belief and the ethics of belief. 

The application of formal methods to philosophical questions. My work here includes papers on metaphysics, epistemology and paradox.