Dr Richard Gray
BSc (Open), MPhil (Cantab), PhD (Edin)
Senior Lecturer
- grayr@cardiff.ac.uk
- +44 (0)29 2087 5416
- 1.33, Adeilad John Percival , Rhodfa Colum, Caerdydd, CF10 3EU
Trosolwg
I am part of the School's Philosophy group.
Additional publications
Gray, R. (forthcoming) ‘On the contrast in contrast cases’, in Phenomenal Presence, (eds) F. Dorsch, M. Nida-Rumelin & F. Macpherson, Oxford: OUP.
Gray, R. (forthcoming) ‘Imagination and Embodiment’, in Aesthetics and the Embodied Mind: Beyond Art Theory and the Cartesian Mind-Body Dichotomy, (ed.) A. Scarinzi, Springer.
Gray, R. (2012) What do our Experiences of Heat and Cold Represent? Philosophical Studies 2012. DOI: 10.1007/s11098-012-0083-5
Gray, R. (2012) Is There a Space of Sensory Modalities? Erkenntnis 2012. DOI: 10.1007/s10670-012-9409-0
Gray, R (2011) ‘On the nature of the senses’ in The Senses: Classical and Contemporary Philosophical Perspectives, (ed.) F. Macpherson, Oxford: OUP.
Gray, R. (2010) ‘An argument for non-reductive representationalism’, American Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 47.
Gray, R (2010) ‘Perception and action: the taste test’, (with Alessandra Tanesini), The Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 60.
Gray, R. (2006) ‘Natural phenomenon terms’, Analysis, vol. 66.
Gray, R. (2005) ‘On the concept of a sense’, Synthese, vol. 147.
Gray, R. (2004) ‘What synaesthesia really tells us about functionalism’, Journal of Consciousness Studies, vol. 11.
Gray, R. (2003) ‘Tye’s representationalism: Feeling the heat? Philosophical Studies, vol. 115.
Gray, R. (2001) ‘Synaesthesia and misrepresentation: A reply to Wager’, Philosophical Psychology, vol. 14.
Gray, R. (2001) ‘Cognitive modules, synaesthesia and the constitution of psychological natural kinds’, Philosophical Psychology, vol. 14.
Bywgraffiad
Richard Gray came to Cardiff in 2004. From 2000-4 he was a lecturer in philosophy at Trinity College Dublin. Prior to that he was at the University of Edinburgh, where he completed his PhD, having previously studied at the University of Cambridge.
Cyhoeddiadau
2022
- Gray, R. 2022. Thermal perception and its relation to touch. Philosophers' Imprint (10.3998/phimp.2547)
2020
- Allen, C., Viola, T., Irvine, E., Sedgmond, J., Castle, H., Gray, R. and Chambers, C. D. 2020. Causal manipulation of feed-forward and recurrent processing differentially affects measures of consciousness. Neuroscience of Consciousness 2020(1), article number: niaa015. (10.1093/nc/niaa015)
2019
- Gray, R. 2019. On the content and character of pain experience. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100(1), pp. 47-68. (10.1111/papq.12261)
2014
- Gray, R. 2014. Pain, perception and the sensory modalities: revisiting the intensive theory. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 5, pp. 87-101. (10.1007/s13164-014-0177-4)
2013
- Gray, R. 2013. What do our experiences of heat and cold represent?. Philosophical Studies 166(1 Supp), pp. 131-151. (10.1007/s11098-012-0083-5)
- Gray, R. 2013. Is there a space of sensory modalities?. Erkenntnis 78(6), pp. 1259-1273. (10.1007/s10670-012-9409-0)
2011
- Gray, R. 2011. On the nature of the senses. In: Macpherson, F. ed. The Senses: Classic and Contemporary Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 243-260.
2010
- Gray, R. and Tanesini, A. 2010. Perception and action: The taste test. Philosophical Quarterly 60(241), pp. 718-734. (10.1111/j.1467-9213.2009.651.x)
- Gray, R. 2010. An argument for nonreductive representationalism. American Philosophical Quarterly 47(4), pp. 365-376.
2006
- Gray, R. 2006. Natural phenomenon terms. Analysis 66(290), pp. 141-148. (10.1111/j.1467-8284.2006.00602.x)
2005
- Gray, R. 2005. On the concept of a sense. Synthese 147(3), pp. 461-475. (10.1007/s11229-005-1334-1)
2004
- Gray, R. 2004. What synaesthesia really tell us about functionalism. Journal of Consciousness Studies 11(9), pp. 64-69.
2003
- Gray, R. 2003. Tye's representationalism: Feeling the heat?. Philosophical Studies 115(3), pp. 245-256. (10.1023/A:1025129319705)
2001
- Gray, R. 2001. Cognitive modules, synaesthesia and the constitution of psychological natural kinds. Philosophical Psychology 14(1), pp. 65-82. (10.1080/09515080120033562)
Addysgu
Current Undergraduate teaching
- Philosophy of Language
- Topics in Metaphysics
- Philosophy of Mind
- Contemporary Epistemology
Current Postgraduate teaching
- Philosophy of Mind Epistemology
Much time and effort has been expended on philosophical questions related to vision, visual perception and visual experience. The assumption has tended to be that what goes for vision can be straightforwardly applied to the other senses.
Much of my work has focused on other senses and sensory processes which have received little attention in the philosophical literature. My PhD thesis, and a number of published papers drawn from it, focused on synaesthesia.
I have also written papers on heat perception, which, so I have argued, can shed light on the nature of perceptual experience. In a recent paper co-authored with Alessandra Tanesini, we have looked at the distinctive nature of taste perception in the context of enactive accounts of perception. All of these have been used to motivate a more general account of the senses.
Research interests
- Philosophy of perception
- Philosophy of mind
- Philosophy of language